



*Regulatory Information Conference*

## DECISION MAKING

March 2012



Presented by: Preston Gillespie  
Vice President, Duke Energy

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---





### Safety Culture

- 13 Components of Safety Culture
  - Decision making
  - Resources
  - Work control
  - Work practices
  - Corrective action program
  - Operating experience
  - Self and independent assessments
  - Environment for raising concerns
  - Preventing, detecting, and mitigating perceptions of retaliation
  - Accountability
  - Continuous learning environment
  - Organizational change management
  - Safety policies

2

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---





### Safety Culture

- In 2011, Improving our Safety Culture was a Major Site Initiative
  - Independent Assessment of Safety Culture
  - Improvement Initiatives include:
    - Improving Corrective Action Program Standards
    - Improving Operability Program Standards
    - Management Focus on Messages and Medium
      - Human Performance, Standard Adherence, & Accountability
    - Safety Culture Training – Classroom & Computer Based
      - Managers, Supervisors, & Individual Contributors
    - Added an on-site Employee Concerns Manager

3

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---




**Safety Culture**

- Today, Let's Focus Attention on our Efforts to Improve Performance Associated with three specific Safety Culture Components
  - Decision-making
  - Continuous learning environment
  - Accountability

4

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---




**Decision Making**

- In June 2011, we returned a risk significant safety system to an Operable status prior to fully testing modified components
- Lessons Learned
  - Blending of the operability and modification process produced unintended outcomes.
    - Parallel paths – Modification and Operability Evaluation
    - Modification provided safety benefits that improved the as found condition
    - Operability determination relied on modification prior to its completion
    - Other options were available
    - Organization demonstrated a lack of rigor regarding standards adherence
  - In spite of the organization's best intent with regard to nuclear safety, our decisions:
    - Allowed the reliance on equipment prior to the completion of the modification process
    - Relied heavily on past practices
    - Conflicted with our own standards

5

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---




**Decision Making**

- Looking Forward - continued improvement in decision-making
  - Risk Recognition:
    - Recommendations from our Operational decision-making processes
    - Operability evaluations associated with risk significant SSCs
    - Complex evaluations impacting the design and licensing basis
    - Decisions relying on judgment (engineering/operational)
    - Understanding of safety significance, exposure time, and mission time
  - Enhancements to the Fleet's Governance and Oversight Processes:
    - Graded approach factoring urgency and risk significance
    - Ensure validity of the underlying assumptions
    - Identify unintended consequences
    - Continuous learning to improve future decisions

6

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---



**Decision Making**

- Leadership Decision-Making Attributes
  - Conservative Decision-Making starts with adherence to standards and processes.
  - Decision makers immersing themselves in problem solving increases their vulnerability to making poor decisions.
  - The importance of decision-making oversight is directly proportional to the urgency and risk associated with the decision.
  - Operational Decisions do not live in perpetuity.
  - Decision makers are accountable for their decisions.

7

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---