

## Sequoyah 2

### 4Q/2015 Plant Inspection Findings

---

## Initiating Events

---

## Mitigating Systems

**Significance:** G Jul 31, 2015

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

**Failure to maintain control of and update safety related design out documents (electrical calculations)**

The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensee's failure to control safety related calculations that reviewed equipment essential to the function of Class 1E electrical systems. The issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CRs 1059281 and 1064042. Planned corrective actions were to revise the calculations.

The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The failure to plan and control updates to safety related calculations to review the suitability of new molded case circuit breakers in Class 1E electrical systems adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of the systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the resolution area of Problem Identification and Resolution [P.3], because the licensee failed to take effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance.

Inspection Report# : [2015007](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:** G Jul 31, 2015

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

**Failure to request a licensee amendment prior to removing interlocks from shared onsite emergency and shutdown AC electric systems**

The inspectors identified a SLIV violation of 10CFR 50.59.c.(2).ii, "Changes, tests and experiments," for the licensee's failure to obtain a license amendment prior to implementing a change to the onsite emergency and shutdown AC electric systems supplying the shared Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) systems. The change removed the kirk key interlocking system from the tie breakers that originally prevented an operator error that would parallel the Unit 1A and Unit 2A 480V AC motor control centers (MCCs). The issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 1076179. The licensee has administrative controls in place to limit the risk of this configuration pending determination of corrective actions.

The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because there was a reasonable likelihood that the change required Commission review and approval prior to implementation and the failure to request approval impacted the regulatory process. Specifically, the departure from acceptance criteria identified in IEEE 308, RG1.81, and RG 1.6 more than minimally increased the likelihood of occurrence of an ERCW power train

malfunction.

Inspection Report# : [2015007](#) (pdf)

**Significance:**  Jul 31, 2015

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

**Failure to identify and correct inadequate procurement evaluation processes**

The inspectors identified three examples of a Green non-cited (NCV) of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action, for the licensee’s failure to identify and correct a conditions adverse to quality that were associated with processes for evaluating Class 1E critical characteristics for molded case circuit breakers. The issue was entered into the licensee’s corrective action program as CRs 1064483, 1064744, 1064479, 1059273 and 1064731. Planned corrective actions were to update procedures to document critical thinking in evaluating CRs and include additional critical characteristics.

The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and the failure to identify and correct nonconformances in Class 1E equipment and the failure to resolve adverse conditions with evaluating Class 1E critical characteristics adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the change management area of Human Performance [H.3] because Leaders failed to use a systematic process for evaluating and implementing change so that nuclear safety remains the overriding priority.

Inspection Report# : [2015007](#) (pdf)

**Significance:**  Jul 31, 2015

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

**Failure to Identify Qualification Criteria Associated with Class 1E Electrical Component Static Performance Characteristics**

The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design Control,” for the licensee’s failure to verify the adequacy of defined shelf life and design life characteristics of Class 1E electrical equipment. The issue was entered into the licensee’s corrective action program as CR 1064785.

The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and the failure to ensure the Class 1E static and dynamic performance characteristics were identified and evaluated adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of the SSCs that responds to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the change management area of Human Performance [H.3] because Leaders failed to use a systematic process for evaluating and implementing change so that nuclear safety remains the overriding priority.

Inspection Report# : [2015007](#) (pdf)

**Significance:**  Jun 30, 2015

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

**Failure to Adequately Follow Foreign Material Control Procedures (Section 1R15)**

A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures and Drawings,” was identified for the licensee’s failure to follow a foreign material exclusion procedure and precluded foreign material

from entering the safety-related Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) system. This resulted in wood debris within the ERCW that ultimately migrated to the 2B2 emergency diesel heat exchanger. Immediate corrective actions included removal of the foreign material and the performance of an engineering analysis to ensure the wood debris did not affect the system operability. The licensee placed this issue into their corrective action program as CR 1033792.

The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the performance deficiency allowed a piece of wood to enter into the 2B2 emergency diesel heat exchanger blocking 11 tubes. Because the finding was a deficiency affecting the design of a mitigating structure, systems, or components (SSCs) that was confirmed not to have resulted in the loss of operability, it was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined that no cross-cutting aspect will be assigned to this performance deficiency since it occurred in 2008 and is therefore not indicative of current licensee performance.

Inspection Report# : [2015002](#) (*pdf*)

---

## **Barrier Integrity**

---

## **Emergency Preparedness**

---

## **Occupational Radiation Safety**

---

## **Public Radiation Safety**

---

## **Security**

Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary. Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

---

## **Miscellaneous**

Last modified : March 01, 2016