

# Perry 1

## 2Q/2015 Plant Inspection Findings

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### Initiating Events

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### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:**  Mar 31, 2015  
Identified By: NRC  
Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation  
**FAILURE TO INITIATE A TRANSIENT COMBUSTIBLE PERMIT**

Inspection Report# : [2015001](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Mar 31, 2015  
Identified By: NRC  
Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation  
**LIQUID PENETRANT TESTING PROCEDURE WAS NOT QUALIFIED FOR ITS FULL APPLICABILITY RANGE**

Inspection Report# : [2015001](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Dec 31, 2014  
Identified By: NRC  
Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation  
**Unevaluated Preconditioning of Emergency Service Water Motor Operated Valves and Check Valves prior to conducting As-Found Inservice Surveillance Testing**

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, "Test Control," for the licensee's unevaluated preconditioning, on October 15, 2014, of emergency service water (ESW) pump discharge motor-operated valves and check valves prior to performing as-found inservice testing (IST). This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program for resolution as Condition Report 2014-15759.

The unevaluated preconditioning was a performance deficiency that was determined to be more than minor, and thus a finding, because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, unevaluated preconditioning of valves could mask their actual as-found conditions and result in an inability to verify their operability, as well as make it difficult to determine whether the valves would perform their intended safety function during an event. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the finding was confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality of the ESW system. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work management component because the licensee did

not implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities to prevent preconditioning of valves prior to testing (H.5).

Inspection Report# : [2014005](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Dec 31, 2014

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

**Inadequate Procedure for Performing an Acceptable Technical Specification Required Channel Check**

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a., “Procedures,” was identified for the licensee’s failure to establish and maintain a correct surveillance inspection procedure for redundant reactivity control system (RRCS) channel checks. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2014–17635 and took immediate actions for a missed surveillance in accordance with TS.

The inspectors determined that the failure to establish and maintain a correct surveillance procedure required by TS 5.4.1.a. was a performance deficiency and resulted in the licensee’s failure to perform a channel check that meets the TS definition of a channel check. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor, and thus a finding, because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the channel check surveillance procedure did not compare the channel indication and status to other indications or status derived from available independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the finding (1) did not affect a reactor protection system trip signal and the function of other redundant trips or diverse methods of reactor shutdown, (2) did not involve control manipulations that unintentionally added positive reactivity, and (3) did not result in a mismanagement of reactivity by operators. No cross-cutting aspect is assigned as this performance deficiency first occurred in 1986 and is not indicative of current licensee performance.

Inspection Report# : [2014005](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Dec 31, 2014

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

**Failure to Follow Licensee Procedure to Properly Screen and Evaluate Temporary Changes to Plant Facilities / Structures, Systems, or Components**

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a., “Procedures,” for the licensee’s failure to implement the requirements of Nuclear Operating Business Practice (NOBP)–LP–4003A, “FENOC 10 CFR 50.59 User Guidelines.” This finding was entered into the licensee’s corrective action program for resolution as Condition Report 2015–00284.

The inspectors determined that the failure to complete a Regulatory Applicability Determination (RAD) specified in NOBP–LP–4003A was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and thus a finding, because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the finding: (1) was not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of

operability or functionality; (2) did not represent an actual loss of safety function and/or system; (3) did not result in the loss of one or more trains of TS equipment; and (4) does not represent the loss of a non-TS train of equipment.

The finding has a

cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the change management component, in that leaders use a systematic process for evaluating and implementing change so that nuclear safety remains the overriding priority (H.3).

Inspection Report# : [2014005](#) (*pdf*)

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## Barrier Integrity

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## Emergency Preparedness

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## Occupational Radiation Safety

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## Public Radiation Safety

**Significance:**  Sep 30, 2014

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV Non-Cited Violation

### **RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FOUND OFF-SITE AT A SCRAP METAL VENDOR FACILITY**

A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1501 was identified on July 14, 2014, for the failure to conduct surveys that may be necessary for the licensee to comply with the regulations in Part 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The inspectors determined that the licensee did not perform adequate surveys to assure compliance with 10 CFR 20.1802, which requires that the licensee control and maintain constant surveillance of licensed material that is in a controlled area or unrestricted areas and that is not in storage. Specifically, on July 14, licensee surveys of the service air compressor lube oil coolers were not adequate to control licensed material from being unconditionally released from the site. The inspectors determined that this was a performance deficiency, the cause of which was reasonably within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct, and should have been prevented. This finding was not subject to traditional enforcement since the incident did not result in a significant safety consequence, did not impact the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function, and was not willful. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report (CR) 2014-11729. Licensee corrective actions included intrusive management actions to address individual performance weaknesses, radioactive material control practices, and sharing lessons learned with applicable station staff.

The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute for program and process and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive material released into the public domain. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding was not a transportation issue, did not involve radioactive effluents, and did not involve the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, challenge the unknown, for the radiation

protection technician's failure to stop when faced with uncertain conditions and to ensure that risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding

Inspection Report# : [2014004](#) (*pdf*)

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## Security

Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary. Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

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## Miscellaneous

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