


Browns Ferry 3

1Q/2014 Performance Indicators

The solid trend line represents the current reporting period.

Licensee's General Comments: none

Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hrs



Thresholds: White > 3.0 Yellow > 6.0 Red > 25.0

Notes


| Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hrs | 2Q/12 | 3Q/12 | 4Q/12 | 1Q/13 | 2Q/13 | 3Q/13 | 4Q/13 | 1Q/14 |
|--|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Unplanned scrams | 3.0 | 0 | 0 | 1.0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1.0 |
| Critical hours | 968.7 | 2208.0 | 2209.0 | 1869.7 | 2184.0 | 2208.0 | 2209.0 | 1421.6 |
| Indicator value | 3.7 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 3.9 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.9 |

Licensee Comments:

1Q/13: Unplanned scrams exceeded a threshold in 1st Quarter of 2013. The following scrams caused the threshold to be exceeded: Automatic Reactor Scram Due to De-Energization of RPS from Actuation of 3A USST Differential Relay occurring on May 22, 2012, Manual Reactor Scram from Low Power During Startup Activities occurring on May 24, 2012, Automatic Reactor Scram Following Main Generator Trip Due to Main Transformer Differential Relay Actuation occurring on May 29, 2012, and Automatic Reactor Scram due to Loss of Vacuum on February 25, 2013.

2Q/12: Unplanned scrams exceeded a threshold in May of 2012. The following scrams caused the threshold to be exceeded: Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Main Turbine Generator Load Reject occurring on September 28, 2011, Automatic Reactor Scram Due to De-Energization of RPS from Actuation of 3A USST Differential Relay occurring on May 22, 2012, Manual Reactor Scram from Low Power During Startup Activities occurring on May 24, 2012, Automatic Reactor Scram Following Main Generator Trip Due to Main Transformer Differential Relay Actuation occurring on May 29, 2012.

Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hrs




Thresholds: White > 6.0

Notes

| Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hrs | 2Q/12 | 3Q/12 | 4Q/12 | 1Q/13 | 2Q/13 | 3Q/13 | 4Q/13 | 1Q/14 |
|---|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Unplanned power changes | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1.0 | 0 | 0 |
| Critical hours | 968.7 | 2208.0 | 2209.0 | 1869.7 | 2184.0 | 2208.0 | 2209.0 | 1421.6 |
| Indicator value | 2.8 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 1.9 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.9 |

Licensee Comments: none

Unplanned Scrams with Complications




Thresholds: White > 1.0

Notes

| Unplanned Scrams with Complications | 2Q/12 | 3Q/12 | 4Q/12 | 1Q/13 | 2Q/13 | 3Q/13 | 4Q/13 | 1Q/14 |
|-------------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Scrams with complications | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1.0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| Indicator value | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 |

Licensee Comments: none

Safety System Functional Failures (BWR)



Thresholds: White > 6.0

Notes

| Safety System Functional Failures (BWR) | 2Q/12 | 3Q/12 | 4Q/12 | 1Q/13 | 2Q/13 | 3Q/13 | 4Q/13 | 1Q/14 |
|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Safety System Functional Failures | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Indicator value | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |

Licensee Comments:

1Q/13: LER 296/2013-001-00 - Inoperable Emergency Diesel Generators due to Failed or Degraded Electric Generator Casing Fan Bearings

4Q/12: The following LERs were once considered Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) that were identified as a result of the NFWA 805 Transition and counted as a single SSFF: LER 259/2012-001-00, LER 259/2012-002-00, LER 259/2012-003-00, LER 259/2012-004-00, LER 259/2012-007-00, and LER 259/2012-007-01. Based on discussions with the NRC and new guidance in NUREG 1022 these LERs are no longer considered to be SSFFs. Based on this new guidance, the SSFF reported in April 2012 are removed for BFN, Units 1, 2, and 3. Changes to data were made on January 14, 2013, by BFN Licensing.

3Q/12: A Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) was presented at the October 17, 2012, Reactor Oversight Process Task Force Meeting related to the application of NUREG 1022 guidance for counting additional failures as a single Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF). This FAQ could impact current or previously submitted data. NUREG 1022 section 2.2, page 29, lines 22-25, indicates that when an evaluation leads to finding additional failures, the original and subsequent failures are counted as one. The evaluation in this case is the ongoing examination of the Browns Ferry Fire Protection Program to support the transition to NFWA 805. The following LERs were once considered SSFFs that were identified as a result of the NFWA 805 Transition and counted as a single SSFF: LER 259/2012-001-00, LER 259/2012-002-00, LER 259/2012-003-00, LER 259/2012-004-00, LER 259/2012-007-00, and LER 259/2012-007-01. Based on discussions with the NRC and new guidance in NUREG 1022 these LERs are no longer considered to be SSFFs.

3Q/12: A Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) was presented at the October 17, 2012, Reactor Oversight Process Task Force Meeting related to the application of NEI 99-02 guidance for counting additional failures as a single Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF). This FAQ could impact current or previously submitted data. NEI 99-02 section 2.2, page 29, lines 22-25, indicates that when an evaluation leads to finding additional failures, the original and subsequent failures are counted as one. The evaluation in this case is the ongoing examination of the Browns Ferry Fire Protection Program to support the transition to NFPA 805. LER 259/2012-007-00, submitted on July 31, 2012, and LER 259/2012-007-01, submitted on September 7, 2012, are SSFFs identified as a result of the NFPA 805 Transition. The following LERs are SSFFs that were identified as a result of the NFPA 805 Transition in 2nd Quarter 2012: LER 259/2012-001-00, LER 259/2012-002-00, LER 259/2012-003-00, and LER 259/2012-004-00. Therefore, these SSFFs are accounted for in the SSFF reported 2nd Quarter of 2012.


3Q/12: NEI 99-02 section 2.2, page 29, lines 22-25, indicates that when an evaluation leads to finding additional failures, the original and subsequent failures are counted as one. The evaluation in this case is the ongoing examination of the Browns Ferry Fire Protection Program to support the transition to NFPA 805. LER 259/2012-007-00, submitted on July 31, 2012, and LER 259/2012-007-01, submitted on September 7, 2012, are Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) identified as a result of the NFPA 805 Transition. The following LERs are SSFFs that were identified as a result of the NFPA 805 Transition in 2nd Quarter 2012: LER 259/2012-001-00, LER 259/2012-002-00, LER 259/2012-003-00, and LER 259/2012-004-00. Therefore, these SSFFs are accounted for in the SSFF reported 2nd Quarter of 2012.

2Q/12: The following LERs are Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) that were identified as a result of the NFPA 805 Transition: LER 259/2012-001-00, LER 259/2012-002-00, LER 259/2012-003-00, and LER 259/2012-004-00. LER 259/2012-007-00, submitted on July 31, 2012, and LER 259/2012-007-01, submitted on September 7, 2012, are SSFFs identified as a result of the NFPA 805 Transition in the 3rd Quarter of 2012. NEI 99-02 section 2.2, page 29, lines 22-25, indicates that when an evaluation leads to finding additional failures, the original and subsequent failures are counted as one. The evaluation in this case is the ongoing examination of the Browns Ferry Fire Protection Program to support the transition to NFPA 805. Therefore, these SSFFs are accounted for in the SSFF reported in the 2nd Quarter 2012.

2Q/12: The following LERs were once considered Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) that were identified as a result of the NFPA 805 Transition: LER 259/2012-001-00, LER 259/2012-002-00, LER 259/2012-003-00, LER 259/2012-004-00, LER 259/2012-007-00, and LER 259/2012-007-01. Based on discussions with the NRC and new guidance in NUREG 1022 these LERs are no longer considered to be SSFFs

2Q/12: The following LERs were identified as a result of the NFPA 805 Transition and are due to the same condition. In accordance with NEI 99-02 section 2.2, the following LERs count as single SSFF: LER 259/2012-001-00 - Unanalyzed Conditions Discovered During NFPA 805 Transition Review, LER 259/2012-002-00 - Fault Propagation During A Postulated Appendix R Event Could Result In An Inability To Close Motor Operated Valves, LER 259/2012-003-00 - Reactor Protection System Circuit Could Potentially Remain Energized During An Appendix R Fire, and LER 259/2012-004-00 - Fire Damage to Cables in Fire Areas Could Cause a Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pump to Spuriously Start.

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Emergency AC Power System



Thresholds: White > 1.00E-6 Yellow > 1.00E-5 Red > 1.00E-4

Notes

| Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Emergency AC Power System | 2Q/12 | 3Q/12 | 4Q/12 | 1Q/13 | 2Q/13 | 3Q/13 | 4Q/13 | 1Q/14 |
|---|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| UAI (Δ CDF) | 1.59E-07 | 2.80E-07 | 2.25E-07 | 5.70E-08 | 1.38E-07 | 1.39E-07 | 1.69E-07 | 2.15E-07 |
| URI (Δ CDF) | -1.17E-06 | -1.15E-06 | -1.13E-06 | -2.42E-07 | -2.30E-07 | -2.17E-07 | -2.04E-07 | -1.90E-07 |
| PLE | NO |
| Indicator value | -1.00E-06 | -8.70E-07 | -9.10E-07 | -1.90E-07 | -9.30E-08 | -7.80E-08 | -3.50E-08 | 2.50E-08 |

Licensee Comments:

1Q/14: Risk Cap Invoked. The MSPI Risk Cap is invoked. The contribution from the highest worth single failure (1.26E-06) has been replaced by a value of 5.00E-07.

4Q/13: Risk Cap Invoked. The MSPI Risk Cap is invoked. The contribution from the highest worth single failure (1.23E-06) has been replaced by a value of 5.00E-07.

3Q/13: Risk Cap Invoked. The MSPI Risk Cap is invoked. The contribution from one Failure to Run (1.21E-06) has been replaced by a value of 5.00E-07.

2Q/13: Risk Cap Invoked. The MSPI Risk Cap is invoked. The contribution from one Failure to Run (1.18E-06) has been replaced by a value of 5.00E-07.


1Q/13: Risk Cap Invoked. Changed PRA Parameter(s). The MSPI Risk Cap is invoked. The contribution from one Failure to Run (1.16E-06) has been replaced by a value of 5.00E-07. MSPI Basis Documents and PRA Parameters were revised based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-003 Revision 007 to reflect Browns Ferry CAFTA PRA

Model Revision 5 approved on 11/06/12. These changes are effective first quarter 2013.

4Q/12: The 3D Diesel Generator Baseline Planned Unavailability was adjusted to reflect the 12-Year Diesel Maintenance Outage scheduled to be performed in the fourth quarter 2012 (FAQ 468).

3Q/12: Changed PRA Parameter(s). The 3B Diesel Generator Baseline Planned Unavailability was adjusted to reflect the 12-Year Diesel Maintenance Outage scheduled to be performed in the third quarter of 2012 (FAQ 468).

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, High Pressure Injection System



Thresholds: White > 1.00E-6 Yellow > 1.00E-5 Red > 1.00E-4

Notes

| Mitigating Systems Performance Index, High Pressure Injection System | 2Q/12 | 3Q/12 | 4Q/12 | 1Q/13 | 2Q/13 | 3Q/13 | 4Q/13 | 1Q/14 |
|--|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| UAI (ΔCDF) | 1.14E-07 | 1.12E-07 | 5.13E-08 | 6.49E-08 | 6.34E-08 | 1.72E-09 | 4.90E-10 | 6.97E-08 |
| URI (ΔCDF) | -1.04E-07 | -1.01E-07 | -1.02E-07 | -1.74E-07 | -1.75E-07 | -1.75E-07 | -1.75E-07 | -1.75E-07 |
| PLE | NO |
| Indicator value | 1.00E-08 | 1.10E-08 | -5.00E-08 | -1.10E-07 | -1.10E-07 | -1.70E-07 | -1.70E-07 | -1.00E-07 |


Licensee Comments:

1Q/13: Changed PRA Parameter(s). MSPI Basis Documents and PRA Parameters were revised based on

Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-003 Revision 007 to reflect Browns Ferry CAFTA PRA Model Revision 5 approved on 11/06/12. These changes are effective first quarter 2013.

3Q/12: Previously submitted data has been revised due to a new more conservative interpretation of short term duration surveillances. A recent Engineering review indicates surveillance listed in the MSPI Basis Document occasionally took longer than 15 minutes. The revision for this quarters previously submitted data incorporates all occurrences of the subject surveillance that took longer than the allotted 15 minutes. This impacts the following data: Unit 1- April 2012. Unit 2 - December 2011, March 2012, June 2012. Unit 3 - November 2011, February 2012, August 2012. No indicator color was impacted.

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Heat Removal System



Thresholds: White > 1.00E-6 Yellow > 1.00E-5 Red > 1.00E-4

Notes

| Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Heat Removal System | 2Q/12 | 3Q/12 | 4Q/12 | 1Q/13 | 2Q/13 | 3Q/13 | 4Q/13 | 1Q/14 |
|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| UAI (ΔCDF) | 9.06E-09 | 4.30E-10 | 1.48E-10 | 1.94E-08 | 5.37E-08 | 4.47E-08 | 2.66E-08 | 2.91E-08 |
| URI (ΔCDF) | 2.69E-07 | 1.71E-07 | 6.63E-08 | 2.25E-07 | -1.73E-07 | -1.73E-07 | -1.73E-07 | -1.73E-07 |
| PLE | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Indicator value | 2.80E-07 | 1.70E-07 | 6.60E-08 | 2.40E-07 | -1.20E-07 | -1.30E-07 | -1.50E-07 | -1.40E-07 |

Licensee Comments:

3Q/13: Added previously uncounted RCIC injection demands. Added demand data for Unit 3 in April 2011, May 2012, and February 2013. BFNs interpretation of what RCIC demands need to be counted changed for RCIC. This did not impact the MSPI color of RCIC.

1Q/13: MSPI Basis Documents and PRA Parameters were revised based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-003 Revision 007 to reflect Browns Ferry CAFTA PRA Model Revision 5 approved on 11/06/12. These changes are effective first quarter 2013.

1Q/13: Changed PRA Parameter(s). MSPI Basis Documents and PRA Parameters were revised based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-003 Revision 007 to reflect Browns Ferry CAFTA PRA Model Revision 5 approved on 11/06/12. These changes are effective first quarter 2013.


3Q/12: Previously submitted data has been revised due to a new more conservative interpretation of short term duration surveillances. A recent Engineering review indicates surveillance listed in the MSPI Basis Document occasionally took longer than 15 minutes. The revision for this quarters previously submitted data incorporates all occurrences of the subject surveillance that took longer than the allotted 15 minutes. This impacts the following data: Unit 3 - October 2011, May 2012. No indicator color was impacted.

3Q/12: Previously submitted data has been revised due to a new more conservative interpretation of short term duration surveillances. A recent Engineering review indicates surveillance listed in the MSPI Basis Document occasionally took longer than 15 minutes. The revision for this quarters previously submitted data incorporates all occurrences of the subject surveillance that took longer than the allotted 15 minutes. This impacts the following data: Unit 3 - October 2011, May 2012. No indicator color was impacted.

2Q/12: Previously submitted data has been revised due to a new more conservative interpretation of short term duration surveillances. A recent Engineering review indicates surveillance listed in the MSPI Basis Document occasionally took longer than 15 minutes. The revision for this quarters previously submitted data incorporates all occurrences of the subject surveillance that took longer than the allotted 15 minutes. This impacts the following data: Unit 3 - October 2011, May 2012. No indicator color was impacted.

2Q/12: Previously submitted data has been revised due to a new more conservative interpretation of short term duration surveillances. A recent Engineering review indicates surveillance listed in the MSPI Basis Document occasionally took longer than 15 minutes. The revision for this quarters previously submitted data incorporates all occurrences of the subject surveillance that took longer than the allotted 15 minutes. This impacts the following data: Unit 3 - October 2011, May 2012. No indicator color was impacted.

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Residual Heat Removal System



Thresholds: White > 1.00E-6 Yellow > 1.00E-5 Red > 1.00E-4

Notes

| Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Residual Heat Removal System | 2Q/12 | 3Q/12 | 4Q/12 | 1Q/13 | 2Q/13 | 3Q/13 | 4Q/13 | 1Q/14 |
|--|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| UAI (ΔCDF) | 2.18E-08 | 3.43E-08 | 2.76E-08 | 3.32E-08 | 1.96E-08 | 3.38E-08 | 6.79E-08 | 7.63E-08 |
| URI (ΔCDF) | 3.01E-08 | 3.56E-08 | 3.74E-08 | 7.27E-08 | 7.23E-09 | 6.99E-09 | 6.75E-09 | 6.51E-09 |
| PLE | NO |
| Indicator value | 5.20E-08 | 7.00E-08 | 6.50E-08 | 1.10E-07 | 2.70E-08 | 4.10E-08 | 7.50E-08 | 8.30E-08 |

Licensee Comments:

1Q/14: Changed PRA Parameter(s). During the first quarter of 2014, the following changes were made to numerical values in the INPO CDE database for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN). 1. Common Cause Factor (CCF) for 3-FCV-023-0034 was changed to the correct value of 2.00. Effective 2011-01 to present. 2. Operational Non-test demands(D) value for 2-FCV-023-0046 was changed to the correct value of 82. Effective 2012-01 to present. 3. Operational Non-test demands(D) value for 3-FCV-023-0040 was changed to the correct value of 88. Effective 2012-01 to present. 4. Operational Non-test run-hours value for 1-PMP-074-0039 was changed to the correct value of 333.54 hours. Effective 2011-01 to present. 5. Test run-hours value for 1-PMP-074-0039 was changed to the correct value of 31.87 hours. Effective 2011-01 to present. These changes result in the BFN Residual Heat Removal System MSPI indicator values for past reporting periods to be different than previously reported, as indicated by the effective dates identified above. No MSPI color changes resulted from these changes to the numerical values. Reference BFN Problem Evaluation Report (PER) 851845.

4Q/13: Changed PRA Parameter(s).

3Q/13: Changed PRA Parameter(s).

2Q/13: Changed PRA Parameter(s).

1Q/13: Changed PRA Parameter(s). MSPI Basis Documents and PRA Parameters were revised based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-003 Revision 007 to reflect Browns Ferry CAFTA PRA Model Revision 5 approved on 11/06/12. These changes are effective first quarter 2013.


1Q/13: Changed PRA Parameter(s). MSPI Basis Documents and PRA Parameters were revised based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-003 Revision 007 to reflect Browns Ferry CAFTA PRA Model Revision 5 approved on 11/06/12. These changes are effective first quarter 2013.

4Q/12: Changed PRA Parameter(s).

3Q/12: Changed PRA Parameter(s).

2Q/12: Changed PRA Parameter(s).

Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Cooling Water Systems



Thresholds: White > 1.00E-6 Yellow > 1.00E-5 Red > 1.00E-4

Notes

| Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Cooling Water Systems | 2Q/12 | 3Q/12 | 4Q/12 | 1Q/13 | 2Q/13 | 3Q/13 | 4Q/13 | 1Q/14 |
|---|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| UAI (ΔCDF) | 4.02E-07 | 4.19E-07 | 3.35E-07 | 1.01E-07 | 1.24E-07 | 1.53E-07 | 1.69E-07 | 1.75E-07 |
| URI (ΔCDF) | -9.73E-08 | -9.73E-08 | -9.73E-08 | -2.99E-08 | -2.99E-08 | -2.99E-08 | -2.99E-08 | -2.99E-08 |
| PLE | NO |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|--|
| | | | | | | | | | |
| Indicator value | 3.00E-07 | 3.20E-07 | 2.40E-07 | 7.10E-08 | 9.40E-08 | 1.20E-07 | 1.40E-07 | 1.50E-07 | |


Licensee Comments:

1Q/13: Changed PRA Parameter(s). MSPI Basis Documents and PRA Parameters were revised based on Calculation NDN-000-999-2010-003 Revision 007 to reflect Browns Ferry CAFTA PRA Model Revision 5 approved on 11/06/12. These changes are effective first quarter 2013.

3Q/12: 2nd Quarter 2012 Data were updated. On April 4, 2012, B2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water pump failed to start when given a start signal. No indicator color was impacted by this event.

2Q/12: 2nd Quarter 2012 Data were updated. On April 4, 2012, B2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water pump failed to start when given a start signal. No indicator color was impacted by this event.

Reactor Coolant System Activity



Thresholds: White > 50.0 Yellow > 100.0


Notes

| Reactor Coolant System Activity | 4/12 | 5/12 | 6/12 | 7/12 | 8/12 | 9/12 | 10/12 | 11/12 | 12/12 | 1/13 | 2/13 | 3/13 |
|---------------------------------|----------|------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Maximum activity | 0.000227 | N/A | 0.000073 | 0.000091 | 0.000133 | 0.000067 | 0.000145 | 0.000091 | 0.000152 | 0.000116 | 0.000081 | 0.000064 |
| Technical specification limit | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Indicator value | 0 | N/A | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Reactor Coolant System Activity | 4/13 | 5/13 | 6/13 | 7/13 | 8/13 | 9/13 | 10/13 | 11/13 | 12/13 | 1/14 | 2/14 | 3/14 |
| Maximum activity | 0.000089 | 0.000244 | 0.000087 | 0.000071 | 0.000072 | 0.000127 | 0.000105 | 0.000080 | 0.000059 | 0.000094 | 0.000088 | N/A |
| Technical specification limit | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 |
| Indicator value | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | N/A |

Licensee Comments: none

Reactor Coolant System Leakage



Thresholds: White > 50.0 Yellow > 100.0

Notes


| Reactor Coolant System Leakage | 4/12 | 5/12 | 6/12 | 7/12 | 8/12 | 9/12 | 10/12 | 11/12 | 12/12 | 1/13 | 2/13 | 3/13 |
|--------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Maximum leakage | 2.240 | 2.090 | 1.990 | 2.060 | 3.370 | 1.810 | 1.750 | 1.850 | 1.820 | 1.680 | 1.760 | 1.700 |
| Technical specification limit | 30.0 | 30.0 | 30.0 | 30.0 | 30.0 | 30.0 | 30.0 | 30.0 | 30.0 | 30.0 | 30.0 | 30.0 |
| Indicator value | 7.5 | 7.0 | 6.6 | 6.9 | 11.2 | 6.0 | 5.8 | 6.2 | 6.1 | 5.6 | 5.9 | 5.7 |
| Reactor Coolant System Leakage | 4/13 | 5/13 | 6/13 | 7/13 | 8/13 | 9/13 | 10/13 | 11/13 | 12/13 | 1/14 | 2/14 | 3/14 |
| Maximum leakage | 1.760 | 1.650 | 1.650 | 1.760 | 1.670 | 1.670 | 1.720 | 1.690 | 1.800 | 1.750 | 1.580 | 1.610 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Technical specification limit | 30.0 | 30.0 | 30.0 | 30.0 | 30.0 | 30.0 | 30.0 | 30.0 | 30.0 | 30.0 | 30.0 | 30.0 |
| Indicator value | 5.9 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.9 | 5.6 | 5.6 | 5.7 | 5.6 | 6.0 | 5.8 | 5.3 | 5.4 |

Licensee Comments:

6/13: The Maximum RCS Identified Leakage (gpm) was updated to reflect the correct leakage. This condition was identified in PER 694496. This affected July 2012 to December 2012. There was no color change.

Drill/Exercise Performance



Thresholds: White < 90.0% Yellow < 70.0%


Notes

| Drill/Exercise Performance | 2Q/12 | 3Q/12 | 4Q/12 | 1Q/13 | 2Q/13 | 3Q/13 | 4Q/13 | 1Q/14 |
|----------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Successful opportunities | 6.0 | 34.0 | 14.0 | 24.0 | 26.0 | 40.0 | 70.0 | 12.0 |
| Total opportunities | 6.0 | 34.0 | 14.0 | 24.0 | 26.0 | 42.0 | 70.0 | 12.0 |
| Indicator value | 98.7% | 98.6% | 98.9% | 99.2% | 99.3% | 98.9% | 99.1% | 99.1% |

Licensee Comments:

1Q/14: Revised Successful drill, exer & event opportunities to reflect an additional DEP failure for the September (3rd quarter) 2013 report period. This revision did not result in a color change. PER # 836157

ERO Drill Participation




Thresholds: White < 80.0% Yellow < 60.0%

Notes

| ERO Drill Participation | 2Q/12 | 3Q/12 | 4Q/12 | 1Q/13 | 2Q/13 | 3Q/13 | 4Q/13 | 1Q/14 |
|-----------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-------|--------|
| Participating Key personnel | 73.0 | 77.0 | 73.0 | 76.0 | 76.0 | 79.0 | 81.0 | 76.0 |
| Total Key personnel | 73.0 | 77.0 | 73.0 | 76.0 | 77.0 | 80.0 | 82.0 | 76.0 |
| Indicator value | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 98.7% | 98.8% | 98.8% | 100.0% |

Licensee Comments: none

Alert & Notification System




Thresholds: White < 94.0% Yellow < 90.0%

Notes

| Alert & Notification System | 2Q/12 | 3Q/12 | 4Q/12 | 1Q/13 | 2Q/13 | 3Q/13 | 4Q/13 | 1Q/14 |
|-----------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|
| Successful siren-tests | 799 | 799 | 899 | 900 | 800 | 932 | 622 | 1040 |
| Total sirens-tests | 800 | 800 | 900 | 900 | 800 | 932 | 624 | 1040 |
| Indicator value | 99.8% | 99.9% | 99.9% | 99.9% | 99.9% | 100.0% | 99.9% | 99.9% |

Licensee Comments: none

Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness




Thresholds: White > 2.0 Yellow > 5.0

Notes

| Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness | 2Q/12 | 3Q/12 | 4Q/12 | 1Q/13 | 2Q/13 | 3Q/13 | 4Q/13 | 1Q/14 |
|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| High radiation area occurrences | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Very high radiation area occurrences | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Unintended exposure occurrences | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Indicator value | 0 |

Licensee Comments: none

RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent



Thresholds: White > 1.0 Yellow > 3.0

Notes

| RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent | 2Q/12 | 3Q/12 | 4Q/12 | 1Q/13 | 2Q/13 | 3Q/13 | 4Q/13 | 1Q/14 |
|---------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| RETS/ODCM occurrences | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Indicator value | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Licensee Comments: none

Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary. Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page.

 [Action Matrix Summary](#) | [Inspection Findings Summary](#) | [PI Summary](#) | [Reactor Oversight Process](#)

Last Modified: April 23, 2014