

## McGuire 2

### 3Q/2013 Plant Inspection Findings

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### Initiating Events

**Significance:** G Mar 31, 2013

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: FIN Finding

#### **Failure to Revise Turbine Inlet Pressure Calibration Procedure**

A self-revealing finding was identified for the licensee's failure to follow the requirements of the station modification program manual EDM 601 during implementation of a high pressure turbine replacement modification revision. This resulted in Anticipated Transient Without Scram Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) calibration procedures not being revised with the proper setpoints.

The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it affected the Design Control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that AMSAC actuated causing a turbine trip. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting aspect of the need for work groups to maintain appropriate interfaces and communicate, coordinate with each other during important work activities as described in the Work Control component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because necessary revisions to the AMSAC input device calibration procedures were not adequately communicated.

Inspection Report# : [2013002](#) (*pdf*)

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### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:** G Feb 15, 2013

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Modifications Result in Nonfunctional Fire Doors**

An NRC identified Green non-cited violation of McGuire's Selected Licensing Commitment 16.9.5, Fire Rated Assemblies was identified for the licensee's inadequate implementation of modifications that results in nonfunctional fire doors. The Licensee has entered the finding into the corrective action program as PIP M-13-01454, declared the doors as nonfunctional and implemented fire watches for the fire areas of concern.

The licensee's inadequate implementation of fire door modifications that resulted in the failure to meet the requirements of Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.5, Fire Rated Assemblies, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Events. Specifically, the welding modifications performed on nine doors adversely affected their capability to provide the required 3-hours of fire resistance. In accordance with NRC IMC 0609 Appendix F, Part 1; "Fire Protection Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Worksheet" the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the fire doors would still provide a minimum of 20 minutes fire endurance protection. A cross-cutting aspect was not assigned because the performance

deficiency does not reflect current licensee performance. (Section 1R05.02)

Inspection Report# : [2013007](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Dec 31, 2012

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Failure to maintain complete and accurate pre-fire plans**

An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of the Unit 2 Facility Operating License, Condition 2.C.4, Fire Protection Program, was identified for failure to maintain pre-fire plans in areas that contain safety-related equipment. The inspectors identified that all copies of fire strategy plan view for the Unit 2 lower annulus and containment were missing from their pre-fire plans and unavailable to the Fire Brigade Leader and Operations personnel in the event of a fire in the Unit 2 reactor building. Corrective actions included replacement of the missing fire strategy plan views and additional review of the fire strategy books located in the Fire Brigade Leader's Kit, Control Room, and Emergency Preparedness office. This violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program (CAP) as Problem Investigation Program (PIP) M 12-08270.

The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Events (Fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective, in that, it degraded the manual fire suppression capability. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the fire brigade consisted of plant personnel familiar with the plant layout and associated fire hazards and appropriate fire-fighting equipment was available. The cause of the PD was directly related to the aspect of complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures of the Resources Component in the cross-cutting area of Human Performance because the Fire Brigade Program Administrator failed to include all approved plan view updates into the fire brigade response strategies. [H.2(c)]

Inspection Report# : [2012005](#) (*pdf*)

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## Barrier Integrity

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## Emergency Preparedness

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## Occupational Radiation Safety

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## Public Radiation Safety

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## Security

Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary. Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

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## Miscellaneous

Last modified : December 03, 2013