

Susquehanna 1

2Q/2013 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance: G Dec 31, 2012

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Improper Stress Intensification Factor Results in Not Identifying ASME Limits for Pipe Stress Being Exceeded

A self-revealing Green NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criteria III, "Design Control," was identified related to a leak on the Unit 1 'A' reactor recirculation pump suction line decontamination flange weld. Specifically, PPL personnel used an incorrect value for stress intensification factor in the vibration analysis in 2004 to support an extended power uprate (EPU). When the correct stress intensification factor was applied, American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) OM-3 code limits for endurance and fatigue stress were exceeded. The weld failure resulted in pressure boundary leakage in excess of TS 3.4.4 limits from approximately June 16 through 19, 2012. PPL staff entered the problem in the PPL corrective action program (CAP) as CR 1589390, repaired and modified the flange line, and revised the calculation.

The inspectors reviewed the performance deficiency using NRC IMC 0612, Appendix B, "Issue Screening," and determined to be more than minor because it affected the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of design control. The issue adversely affected the associated cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The finding was evaluated using Section A of IMC 609, Appendix A, Exhibit 1, "Initiating Events Screening Questions." Since the finding result could not have reasonably exceeded the leak rate for a small loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and did not likely affect other systems used to mitigate a LOCA resulting in a total loss of their function (e.g., inter-facing system LOCA), the finding screened to very low safety significance (Green). This finding was determined to not be indicative of current performance because the deficiency occurred in 2004 and procedures and training are in place that would have precluded the issue. Therefore, no cross-cutting aspect is assigned. (Section 4OA2)

Inspection Report# : [2012005](#) (*pdf*)

Significance: G Sep 30, 2012

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Procedure for Acts of Nature

The inspectors identified a Green NCV of TS 5.4.1, "Procedures," when PPL did not maintain adequate procedures to respond proactively to acts of nature. Specifically, PPL's adverse weather procedure did not ensure timely risk management activities for imminent adverse weather were completed despite a National Weather Service (NWS) declaration of a high wind watch, high wind advisory, and a tornado watch. PPL entered this item in their Corrective Action Program (CAP) as condition report (CR) 1628452.

The issue was evaluated in accordance with IMC 0612 and determined to be more than minor since it affected the procedure quality attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and its objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the inadequate procedure prevented PPL from taking proactive steps to limit the likelihood of high wind or

tornado-related missile hazards upsetting plant electrical power systems. The finding screened to Green in accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, and Appendix A, Exhibit 1, since it did not cause a reactor trip, involve the complete or partial loss of mitigation or support equipment, or impact the frequency of a fire or internal flooding event. The finding was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution - CAP because PPL did not identify issues completely, accurately, and in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, PPL did not identify that the Off Normal procedure was inadequate both during the 2011 periodic procedural review and during documentation of inspector observations in May 2012 as part of CR 1579977. [P.1(a)] (Section 1R01)
 Inspection Report# : [2012004](#) (*pdf*)

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Jun 30, 2013

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Operability Assessment of Synchroscope Switch

Inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” when PPL performed an inadequate operability determination for a synchroscope switch failure that rendered offsite power and the four emergency diesel generators (EDGs) inoperable. This resulted in PPL being in violation of Unit 1 TSs 3.8.1, 3.8.2, and 3.0.3, and Unit 2 TSs 3.6.4.1 and 3.8.2. PPL entered the issue in their CAP as CR 1703293, re-evaluated past operability and submitted a licensee event report (LER) for the associated condition prohibited by plant Technical Specifications (TS) on July 8, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13190A104).

The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor since it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected its objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was evaluated using the SDP of IMC 0609.04. The finding was evaluated under both the Mitigating Systems Exhibit of IMC 0609 Appendix A when Unit 1 was at power and Appendix G for the times when one or both units were in a shutdown condition. Under IMC 0609, Appendix A, the finding screened to Green since it was not a design or qualification deficiency and was not a potential or actual loss of system or safety function. Under IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklists 5 through 7, the inspectors screened the issue to Green since it affected the requirement for operable DGs under TS 3.8.1 and TS 3.8.2. The inspectors determined that a Phase 2 analysis was not warranted since it did not match those criteria listed for further analysis in these checklists. Specifically, since all automatic transfer functions of off-site power and the EDGs remained functional, inspectors determined that none of the functions evaluated under the SDPs were affected. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R), corrective action program (CAP), because PPL staff did not thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address the causes and extent of conditions, to include properly classifying, prioritizing and evaluating for operability. Specifically, PPL staff did not appropriately evaluate the effect that the synchroscope switch failure had on offsite power and emergency diesel generator operability.

Inspection Report# : [2013003](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  May 22, 2013

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: AV Apparent Violation

Failure to Restrict Operators from Performing Licensed Duties with Medically Disqualifying Conditions and Failure to Notify the NRC Within 30 Days of Discovering Changes in Medical Conditions

The inspectors identified: 1) an apparent violation (AV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 55.21, "Medical Examination;" Part 55.25 "Incapacitation because of disability or illness;" Part 55.33, "Disposition of an Initial Application," for the failure of the licensee to restrict operators from performing licensed duties when they had disqualifying medical conditions; and 10 CFR 50.74, "Notification of change in operator or senior operator status," for PPL's failure to notify the NRC within 30 days of changes in licensed operators' medical conditions; and, 2) a related finding of very low safety significance (Green) for PPL's failure to implement effective corrective actions to prevent this recurring AV.

Specifically, the inspectors identified that four licensed operators developed disqualifying medical conditions that were not properly evaluated by PPL staff in accordance with ANSI/ANS-3.4-1983, "American National Standard Medical Certification and Monitoring of Personnel Requiring Operator Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants." Additionally, PPL did not restrict the operators from performing licensed duties or obtain NRC approval (by requesting conditioned licenses) to continue to perform licensed duties, which caused the operators to not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 55.33(a)(1). Additionally, the inspectors identified eight instances in which PPL failed to notify the NRC within 30 days of learning of changes in licensed operator medical conditions that involved permanent disabilities/illnesses as required by 10 CFR 50.74. This resulted in the operators performing licensed operator duties without properly restricted licenses. PPL has taken actions to correct these issues by formally notifying the NRC and requesting conditioned licenses, as necessary, training the licensed operators and medical staff in the applicable requirements, and revising related procedures to provide additional guidance and require annual training. PPL entered this issue into their corrective action program. (CR-1709539)

The inspectors reviewed this issue in accordance with NRC IMC 0612, Appendix B, "Issue Screening" for traditional enforcement and as part of the Reactor Oversight process (ROP). Under the ROP, the inspectors also identified a related finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving PPL's failure to prevent this recurring AV.

Inspection Report# : [2013008](#) (pdf)

Significance:  May 22, 2013

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: AV Apparent Violation

Failure to Establish and Implement Written Procedures for Operating Plant Equipment Failure to Provide Complete and Accurate Medical Information for Licensed Operator Applications

The inspectors identified an AV of 10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and Accuracy of Information," related to PPL's failure to provide information to the NRC regarding medical examinations of licensed operators that was complete and accurate in all material respects. Specifically, PPL submitted three NRC licensed operator renewal applications and one initial license application, each of which certified the medical fitness of the applicants and that no restricting license conditions were necessary. However, the applicants, in fact, each had medical conditions that did not meet the minimum standards of 10 CFR 55.33(a)(1) and required license conditions to be in place in order for the operators to perform licensed activities. PPL entered this issue into their corrective action program. (CR-1709540)

The inspectors determined that PPL's failure to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC was a performance deficiency that was within PPL's ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. The inspectors determined that TE applies, as the issue impacted the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function. Specifically, the NRC issued new and/or renewed licenses to the operators based on information that was not complete and accurate in all material respects. The performance deficiency was screened against the ROP per the guidance of IMC 0612, Appendix B, "Issue Screening." No associated ROP finding was identified and no cross-cutting aspect was assigned. This issue constitutes an apparent violation in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy, and its final significance will be dispositioned in separate future correspondence.

Inspection Report# : [2013008](#) (pdf)

Significance: N/A Mar 31, 2013

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 Screening of TS Bases Change

The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV (SL-IV) NCV of 10 CFR 50.59, “Changes, Tests, and Experiments,” when PPL made changes that affected Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS 3.8.3 without obtaining a license amendment pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90. Specifically, PPL changed the TS 3.8.3 bases to support raising the American Petroleum Institute (API) gravity of acceptable diesel fuel oil by crediting the fuel oil day tank capacity to meet the onsite fuel requirements. This change altered the intent of TS 3.8.3. PPL entered this item in their CAP as CR 1678266, made urgent changes to surveillance procedures, evaluated the issue, and ultimately agreed with this conclusion.

The inspectors determined that the failure to implement the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 for changes to the TSBs was a performance deficiency within PPL’s ability to foresee and correct. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0612 Appendix B. The inspectors determined that this issue impacted the regulatory function by failing to receive prior NRC approval for changes in licensed activities. Therefore, the violation was compared to examples in Enforcement Policy section 6. The violation was determined to be more than minor based on similarity to SLIV example 6.1.d.2, a 10 CFR 50.59 violation that resulted in conditions evaluated as having very low safety significance. The inspectors also evaluated the performance deficiency under the ROP and determined that the associated ROP finding was minor since PPL had not accepted fuel oil deliveries with a higher gravity. As such, no cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding.

Inspection Report# : [2013002](#) (*pdf*)

Significance: G Mar 31, 2013

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Procedure for Control Room Cooling Fan Train Failure

A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criteria V “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” was identified because PPL did not ensure alarm response procedures (ARPs) for control room cooling fan train failures were adequate, which resulted in the subsequent loss of both trains of cooling during clearance order (CO) application for fan repair work. Specifically, the ARP actions were deficient in allowing an abnormal system control switch configuration that led to the inadvertent shutdown of the in-service ‘B’ train fans during the application of the CO process to perform work on the failed ‘A’ control room cooling fan train. PPL entered the issue into their CAP to repair the failed damper and also evaluate the extent-of-condition to ensure the adequacy of other applicable ventilation procedures.

The inspectors determined the deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating System Cornerstone. The inadequate procedure resulted in the loss of control room cooling fans, which affects the objective to ensure the availability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined through a review of IMC 0609 Appendix A, Exhibit 2, “Mitigating Systems Screening Questions,” that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not related to a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of a credited mitigating system safety function because cooling was restored in a timely manner, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to external initiating events. The control room operators immediately recognized the loss of cooling and took manual action to restart the ‘B’ cooling train within 15 minutes to ensure control room temperatures were not adversely affected. The finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the inadequate ARP was an historical issue not indicative of current performance. Specifically, the procedures had not been adequately identified and revised in 2003 and this occurred outside of the nominal three-year period for evaluating present performance as defined in IMC 0612, section 03.15. Additionally, PPL has instituted procedure and CAP improvements since that time which would have prevented the performance deficiency.

Inspection Report# : [2013002](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Sep 30, 2012

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Implement Risk Management Actions

The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) when PPL did not implement risk management actions (RMAs) during maintenance as required by station procedures. The inspectors identified multiple examples of PPL non-compliance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4); PPL's implementing procedures NDAP-QA-0340, "Protected Equipment Program;" and NDAP-QA-1902, "Integrated Risk Management." PPL entered the issue in their CAP as CRs 1611044, 1604007, 1601929, 1602495, and 1611876.

The finding was more than minor because it was similar to IMC 0612, Appendix E, examples 7.e and 7.f. Specifically, elevated plant risk required RMAs or additional RMAs that were not implemented as required by plant procedures.

The finding also affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and its objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, the issues were determined to involve PPL's assessment and management of risk associated with performing maintenance activities and was further assessed under IMC 0609, Appendix K, "Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management SDP." The issue was evaluated by a Senior Reactor Analyst utilizing flowchart 2, and the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) since it did not result in an increase to either the incremental core damage probability (ICDP) or to the incremental large early release probability (ILERP). The finding was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Control, in that PPL did not plan work activities, consistent with nuclear safety, by incorporating risk insights. Specifically, PPL did not incorporate RMAs into its work activities despite recognition of increased risk. [H.3(a)] (Section 1R13)

Inspection Report# : [2012004](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Sep 10, 2012

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Compensatory Actions for Inadequate MOV Grease Analysis Procedures

The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions," because PPL did not take appropriate action to promptly correct an identified condition adverse to quality associated with PPL's motor-operated valve (MOV) lubrication program. PPL did not adhere to the corrective action timeliness standards specified in its corrective action process procedure NDAP-QA-0702, "Action Request and Condition Report Process," Revision 36. Section 7.56.1 states, in part, that compensatory action will be provided if permanent action will not be performed in a timely fashion. Specifically, while evaluating permanent revisions to the program to address the deficiencies, PPL did not take compensatory actions to address MOV grease analysis procedure and engineer qualification program deficiencies before sixty MOV grease analyses were completed in refueling outage 15. PPL entered this performance deficiency into their CAP under CR 1562326.

The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, failure to implement compensatory actions to analyze grease samples in MOVs affects the reliability of these valves. An MOV lubrication program is an integral part of the station's Generic Letter 89-10 program for safety-related MOVs. PPL uses the results of the MOV grease analysis to determine the need for a valve actuator overhaul. The inspectors screened this issue to Green via Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4 and Appendix A, because the finding does not represent a loss of system and/or function, does not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time or two separate safety systems out-of-service for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, and does not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance with the licensee's Maintenance Rule program for greater than 24 hrs. The

inspectors determined that this issue had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices, because PPL personnel did not follow PPL corrective action program procedure requirements regarding compensatory actions [H.4(b)]. (Section 40A2.1.c(1))

Inspection Report# : [2012009](#) (pdf)

Significance:  Sep 10, 2012

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Identify and Correct a CAQ Associated with a Safety-Related Battery Maintenance Procedure

The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Actions,” because PPL did not identify and correct the inadequate weekly testing procedure that resulted in the inoperability of the safety-related 24-volt battery 1D670 that occurred on March 1, 2012. Specifically, because the engineer assigned to perform the Apparent Cause Evaluation (ACE) for the March 1, 2012, failure did not interview the technicians who performed the last weekly surveillance on the battery before the failure, PPL did not identify that the weekly testing procedure did not provide adequate instructions for restoring low battery electrolyte level. PPL entered this performance deficiency into their CAP as CR 1602339.

The inspectors determined that this performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and its objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, as evidenced by the

events on March 1, 2012, the use of the inadequate procedure resulted in the inoperability of the 1D670 battery that supports operation of the safety-related source range and intermediate range instrumentation. The inspectors determined that the inadequate procedure problem was a condition adverse to quality. The inspectors screened this issue to Green via Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4 and Appendix A, because the finding does not represent a loss of system and/or function, does not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time or two separate safety systems out-of-service for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, and does not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance with the licensee’s Maintenance Rule program for greater than 24 hrs. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, corrective action program, because PPL did not appropriately evaluate the unexpected inoperability of a safety-related battery such that a condition adverse to quality, the inadequate maintenance procedure that likely caused the battery inoperability, was identified and corrected [P.1. (c)]. (Section 40A2.1.c(2))

Inspection Report# : [2012009](#) (pdf)

Significance:  Sep 10, 2012

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to identify and Correct a CAQ Associated with Reactor Recirculation Valve Exercising Surveillance Procedure

The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Actions,” because PPL did not identify an inadequate recirculation valve surveillance procedure when the licensee completed the extent of condition review that was performed as part of the root cause analysis for the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) ramp generator signal converter (RGSC) failure on June 29, 2011. Specifically, PPL did not adhere to the extent of condition determination standards established in PPL procedure NDAP-00-0752, “Cause Analysis.” The actions taken to address the extent of condition were not of a depth sufficient to identify the same deficiency that existed in the RCIC flow surveillance procedure in other applicable surveillance procedures. As a result, the inadequate recirculation valve surveillance procedure was not identified. PPL entered this performance deficiency into their CAP

as CR 1596633.

The inspectors determined that this performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the procedural quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and its objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, PPL did not complete an evaluation of the extent of condition for the identified inadequate RCIC surveillance procedure to a depth that would have identified the same deficiency in other similar procedures. As a result, an independent review by inspectors identified a similar condition associated with the reactor recirculation valve exercising procedure. The inspectors determined that this procedure problem was a condition adverse to quality. The inspectors screened this issue to Green via Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4 and Appendix A, because the finding does not represent a loss of system and/or function, does not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time or two separate safety systems out-of-service for greater than its technical specification allowed

outage time, and does not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance with the licensee's Maintenance Rule program for greater than 24 hrs. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, corrective action program, because, although the root cause analysis appropriately bounded and defined the necessary actions to address the extent of condition, the implementation of those actions was insufficient to ensure similar conditions did not exist in other site procedures [P.1.(d)]. (Section 40A2.1.c(3))

Inspection Report# : [2012009](#) (*pdf*)

Significance: SL-IV Nov 08, 2011

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: VIO Violation

Violation of 10CFR55.25, Failure to Notify NRC of a Change in Medical Status and Request a Conditional License

The inspectors identified a SL IV NOV of 10 CFR 55.25, "Incapacitation Because of Disability or Illness," for PPL failing to notify the NRC of a known permanent change in medical status of a licensed operator, and 10 CFR 55.3, "License Requirements," for failing to ensure that an individual license holder, in the capacity of a reactor operator (RO), met the medical prerequisites prior to performing licensed operator duties. Specifically, an RO failed a medical examination in both 2009 and 2011 which identified a disqualifying condition and performed licensed duties without an NRC-approved, amended license. He performed the function of an RO while on watch from April 2009 through August 2011, when the NRC identified this issue. However, the operator did wear corrective lenses while standing watch since April 2009. Upon notification PPL submitted, and the NRC approved, a conditional license to address the disqualifying medical condition. PPL entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR) 1450138.

The inspectors determined that PPL's failure to notify the NRC of a known permanent change in a licensed operator's medical status and request an amended license in order to assume licensed duties was a performance deficiency. This finding was evaluated using the traditional enforcement process because the issue had the potential to impact or impede the regulatory process. Specifically, there was a potential for license termination or the issuance of a conditional license to accommodate for a medical condition. The RO performed licensed duties from April 2009 through August 2011 with a disqualifying condition that required his license to be amended. Using the NRC Enforcement Policy, this violation was characterized at SL IV, in accordance with Section 6.4.

This violation is being cited in the enclosed Notice in accordance with NRC Enforcement Manual Section 3.1.2, because the violation was determined to be repetitive of NRC Enforcement Action (EA) 09-248 dated January 28, 2010, an SLIII Notice of Violation related to a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) standing watch without meeting a medical qualification requirement. The medical conditions in both the former and current cases were similar; therefore, it was reasonable that an adequate extent of condition review for EA-09-248 should have identified the additional discrepancy.

This significance of the associated performance deficiency was screened against the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) per the guidance of IMC 0612, Appendix B. No associated ROP finding was identified and no cross-cutting aspect was assigned. (Section 1R11)

Inspection Report# : [2011004](#) (pdf)

Inspection Report# : [2012005](#) (pdf)

Significance:  Dec 31, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Scenarios for NRC Annual Operating Examinations Did Not Meet Quantitative Standards for Total Malfunctions

The inspectors identified greater finding in that 20% of the NRC annual operating exam simulator scenarios reviewed did not meet the quantitative standard for total malfunctions, 4 to 8 for a single scenario, and 10 to 14 for a scenario set established in NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Form ES-604-1, "Simulator Scenario Review Checklist." In addition, the licensee's procedures NTP-QA-31.11, "Operator Requalification Exam Preparation and Implementation" and NTP-QA-31.7, "Simulator Scenario Writers Guides," recommend these same quantitative standards. The quantitative guidelines for malfunctions is an important metric because it establishes an objective standard used throughout the nuclear industry to ensure that the simulator portion of the NRC-required annual operating exams are written at an appropriate level of difficulty. As an immediate corrective action, the licensee entered this finding into their corrective action process (CR 1187760).

This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigation Systems cornerstone and affected the objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the finding affected the level of difficulty of simulator operating exams which potentially impacted PPL's ability to appropriately evaluate licensed operators. A review of the possible cross-cutting aspects was performed and no cross-cutting aspect was identified that would be considered a contributor to the cause of the finding.

Inspection Report# : [2009005](#) (pdf)

Barrier Integrity

Significance:  Sep 30, 2012

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: FIN Finding

Inadequate Troubleshooting Results in Loss of Secondary Containment and Protected Equipment

A self-revealing Green finding against PPL procedure NDAP-QA-0510, "Troubleshooting Plant Equipment," was identified when inadequate troubleshooting caused repeated inoperability of secondary containment, an associated unplanned Unit 2 entry into a 4-hour limiting condition for operation (LCO) action statement, and a loss of the '1C' fuel pool cooling (FPC) pump during equipment restoration. The FPC pump had been designated as protected equipment as a risk management action. The failure to perform adequate troubleshooting activities to identify and correct equipment problems prior to restoration was a performance deficiency that was within PPL's ability to foresee and prevent. PPL entered this issue into their CAP as CR 1628250.

The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the configuration control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected its objective to provide reasonable

assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the event resulted in the inoperability of secondary containment and loss of a FPC pump. The finding was evaluated in accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, and Appendix A - Exhibit 3, and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not only represent a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the standby gas treatment system and it did not: a) cause the spent fuel pool to exceed a maximum temperature limit; b) cause mechanical fuel damage and detectable release of radio-nuclides; c) result in the loss of spent fuel pool water inventory; or d) affect spent fuel shutdown margin. This finding is related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance – Decision-Making because PPL did not make safety-significant or risk-significant decisions using a systematic process, especially when faced with uncertain or unexpected plant conditions, to ensure safety is maintained. Specifically, PPL failed to restore equipment in a systematic manner, given the intermittent nature of heater faults, to preclude a repeated loss of protected equipment and secondary containment.

[H.1(a)] (Section 1R12)

Inspection Report# : [2012004](#) (*pdf*)

Emergency Preparedness

Significance: G Dec 31, 2012

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure of Full-Scale Drill Critique to Identify an RSPS Weakness

. Inspectors identified a Green NCV associated with emergency preparedness planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and the requirements of Section IV.F.2.g of

10 CFR 50, Appendix E. Specifically, PPL personnel did not identify an Emergency Response Organization (ERO) performance weakness associated with an untimely notification of an emergency declaration during their critique following the full-scale emergency preparedness (EP) drill. In the case of ERO performance, simulator equipment issues prevented the ability of drill controllers to satisfactorily evaluate performance of the ERO and PPL staff did not identify that all off-site response organizations (OROs)

were not notified within fifteen minutes. The critique deficiency was entered into PPL's CAP as CR 1648380. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the ERO attribute of the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure that PPL staff are capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. The inspectors assessed the issue, related to the failure to make a timely notification to the OROs, using NRC IMC 0609 Appendix B, "Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process." PPL's drill critique not identifying the untimely notification met the NRC's definition of a weakness in a full-scale drill. However, because of the unique nature of the equipment failures associated with the notification of the first ORO, inspectors determined that the failure to critique the drill weakness only constituted a degradation of the planning standard (PS) function. Therefore the finding is characterized as very low safety significance (Green). The finding is related to the cross-cutting area of PI&R, CAP, in that PPL staff did not identify a risk significant planning standard (RSPS) performance issue completely, accurately, and in a timely manner commensurate with the safety significance. Specifically, during the critique of the full-scale drill conducted on October 14, 2012, PPL staff did not recognize and critique that an RSPS was not met and did not place this issue into the CAP until prompted by inspectors. [P.1(a)] (Section 1EP6)

Inspection Report# : [2012005](#) (*pdf*)

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Security

Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary. Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Significance: N/A Dec 31, 2012

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Report Common-Cause Inoperability of Independent Trains

. Inspectors identified a SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(vii) for PPL's failure to submit a licensee event report (LER) of a common cause inoperability of two independent trains of reactor protection system (RPS) electrical power monitoring associated with several Unit 1 RPS breakers on May 8, 2012. PPL staff entered the issue into the CAP as CR 1663785 and took action to issue the required LER.

This finding was evaluated using the traditional enforcement process because the failure to accurately report events has the potential to impact or impede the regulatory process. The finding was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation based on example 6.9.d.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This example states that a licensee failing to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73 is an example of a Severity Level IV violation. Because this violation involves the traditional enforcement process and does not have an underlying technical violation that would be considered more-than-minor, inspectors did not assign a cross-cutting aspect to this violation in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B. (Section 1R12)

Inspection Report# : [2012005](#) (*pdf*)

Last modified : September 03, 2013