

## Oconee 3

# 1Q/2013 Plant Inspection Findings

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## Initiating Events

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## Mitigating Systems

**Significance:**  Mar 31, 2013

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **Failure to Maintain Pressure Boundary in Unit-3 Control Battery Room**

An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensee's failure to take timely corrective actions for a condition adverse to quality. The licensee failed to take timely actions to correct the degraded, nonconforming condition resulting from a sheet metal plate over a penetration in the Unit 3 control battery room pressure boundary wall. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP), performed an operability evaluation, and declared the wall operable but degraded/non-conforming (OBDN).

The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Design Control and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective in that functionality of the pressure boundary was not maintained. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not actually result in a safety related system being inoperable. The cause of the finding was directly related to thoroughly evaluates problems in the Corrective Action Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area because the licensee failed to evaluate the sheet metal plate to maintain the safety-related pressure boundary function of the battery room wall. [P.1(c)]

Inspection Report# : [2013002](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Sep 30, 2012

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **Failure to maintain accurate pre-fire plans**

An NRC-identified non-cited violation of the Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3 renewed facility operating licenses, condition 3.D. was identified for the licensee's failure to maintain accurate pre-fire plans in areas that contain safety related equipment. Discrepancies such as failure to identify compressed gas cylinder and chemical storage areas, fire extinguisher locations, and physical building characteristics were identified in 79 fire zone pre-fire plans. The licensee modified the pre-fire plans to correct the deficiencies. This violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program (CAP) as PIP O-12-10817.

The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone Attribute of Protection Against External Events (Fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that inaccurate pre-fire plans could impact the fire brigade's ability to effectively fight a fire. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because an alternate means of safe shutdown

was available, the fire brigade consisted of plant personnel familiar with the plant layout and associated hazards, and appropriate firefighting equipment was available in each area. The cause of the PD was directly related to the aspect of complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures of the Resources Component in the cross cutting area of Human Performance because the licensee failed to ensure that other personnel were assigned the responsibility to maintain the pre-fire plans. [H.2(c)] (1R05)

Inspection Report# : [2012004](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:** G Jun 30, 2012

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Failure to perform a calculation to determine site PMP ponding levels in a timely manner**

An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensee's failure to implement corrective actions for a condition adverse to quality. The licensee did not develop a calculation to determine the maximum on-site water level resulting from a Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) event in a timely manner. Corrective actions included development of a calculation bounding the expected water level resulting from a PMP event. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program (CAP) as PIP O-12-7994.

The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Design Control and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective because there was reasonable doubt that plant equipment was adequately protected from the increased water level and therefore had the potential to result in a loss of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the licensee subsequently demonstrated that the water entering the plant structures would not have resulted in the loss of safety-related or risk-significant equipment. This finding does not have a cross-cutting aspect because the performance deficiency was not indicative of current plant performance. (Section 1R01)

Inspection Report# : [2012003](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:** G Jun 30, 2012

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Failure to follow the engineering change process**

An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, was identified for the licensee's failure to follow EDM 601, Engineering Change Manual, during the design and construction of the Protected Service Water (PSW) ductbank / manhole structure. As a result, rainwater accumulation during a Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) event could enter the Auxiliary Building (AB). Corrective actions included sealing penetrations, installation of an isolation valve, revising procedures, and conducting training. This violation is in the licensee's CAP as PIPs O-12-1317, O-12-1876, O-12-1906 and O-12-2443.

The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors - Flooding and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that water from a PMP event could enter the AB and adversely impact safety-related and / or risk-significant equipment. The licensee was required to perform extensive modeling and calculations to determine what the impact from a PMP event would be on the SSC's located in the lower elevations of the AB. The finding was of very low safety significance due to the high likelihood that the source of the water leaking into the AB would be correctly identified and isolated prior to the loss of safety-related equipment due to the flood. The cause of the finding

was directly related to the aspect of ensuring supervisory oversight of work activities such that nuclear safety is supported of the Work Practices component in the cross-cutting area of Human Performance because the licensee failed to ensure that the appropriate level of supervisory and management oversight was applied during design, modification and construction of Manhole 7. [H.4(c)] (Section 1R01)

Inspection Report# : [2012003](#) (*pdf*)

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## **Barrier Integrity**

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## **Emergency Preparedness**

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## **Occupational Radiation Safety**

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## **Public Radiation Safety**

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## **Security**

Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary. Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

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## **Miscellaneous**

Last modified : June 04, 2013