

# Catawba 2

## 2Q/2012 Plant Inspection Findings

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### Initiating Events

**Significance:** **G** Jun 30, 2012

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Failure to adequately implement tagout procedures**

A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 5.4.1, Procedures, was identified when the licensee failed to follow NSD 500, Red Tags/Configuration Control Tags. The licensee implemented a tagout that was not supported by plant conditions which resulted in the inoperability of the 2B ND train while in Mode 6 with refueling cavity level less than 23 feet. Immediate actions were taken to declare the 2B ND train inoperable and manually reopen the loop isolation valves inside containment. The issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program (CAP) as Problem Identification Program (PIP) report C-12-2313.

The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the isolation of reactor coolant system pressure SSPS relays prevented the opening of the 2B ND loop isolation valves resulting in the 2B ND train being inoperable. Using the screening criteria in IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Phase 1 Operational Checklist 3, PWR Cold Shutdown and Refueling Operation RCS Open and Refueling Cavity <23 feet, a Phase 2 risk analysis was required because the finding increased the likelihood of a loss of decay heat removal. A Phase 3 risk analysis determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because of the less than one hour exposure time. The cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting aspect of the need to keep personnel apprised of the operational impact of work activities as described in the Work Control component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the effect of the tagout on ND system operation was not adequately understood by operations personnel responsible for implementation. [H.3(b)] (Section 1R20)

Inspection Report# : [2012003](#) (*pdf*)

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### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:** TBD Jun 18, 2012

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: AV Apparent Violation

#### **Unit 2 Offsite Power Circuits Inoperable Due to Improper Unit 1 Zone G Modification**

Self-revealing findings were identified for the licensee's failure to follow EDM-141, Procurement Specifications for Services. The licensee did not identify the need for the blocking feature for the instantaneous underfrequency protective function in both the vendor specification and the supporting information provided to the vendor. The offsite power supply to Unit 1 would have been lost anytime there was a generator trip from high power without this blocking feature. This finding resulted in an apparent violation (AV) of TS 3.8.1, AC Sources – Operating, and TS 3.8.2, AC Sources – Shutdown, for Unit 2 because the installed modification resulted in inoperability of the offsite power source for both units. Unit 2 was impacted whenever offsite power was provided from Unit 1. The finding does not represent an immediate safety concern because the licensee corrected the blocking function prior to unit restart. The violation was placed in the licensee's corrective action program as PIP C-12-3403.

The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it affected the availability and reliability of the Equipment Performance attribute and adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective in that an offsite power supply would not have been available to mitigate expected operational transients and design basis

events. For Unit 2, the significance was determined to be Green. No separate cross-cutting aspect is assigned to this finding.

Inspection Report# : [2012010](#) (*pdf*)

Inspection Report# : [2012009](#) (*pdf*)

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**Significance:** Jun 18, 2012

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **Improper Unit 2 Zone G Modification**

A self-revealing finding was identified for the licensee's failure to follow EDM-141, Procurement Specifications for Services. The licensee did not identify the blocking feature for the instantaneous underfrequency protective function in both the vendor specification and the supporting information provided to the vendor. The offsite power supply to Unit 2 would have been lost anytime there was a generator trip from high power and offsite power was provided from Unit 2 without this blocking feature. The licensee corrected the blocking function prior to unit restart.

The performance deficiency was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would result in a more significant safety concern in that Unit 2 would have had a LOSP anytime the generator tripped from a high power condition. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance because the programming error was corrected prior to unit restart; therefore, there was no loss of safety function. The same cross-cutting aspect for the Unit 1 finding also applies to this finding; therefore, no separate cross-cutting aspect will be assigned to this finding.

Inspection Report# : [2012009](#) (*pdf*)

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## **Barrier Integrity**

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## **Emergency Preparedness**

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## **Occupational Radiation Safety**

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## **Public Radiation Safety**

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## **Security**

Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary. Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

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## **Miscellaneous**

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