

Catawba 2

4Q/2011 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Jun 30, 2011

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate procedures for obtaining lube oil samples from the 2B NI pump

A self-revealing non-cited violation was identified for the licensee's failure to provide adequate instructions for obtaining oil samples on the 2B safety injection (NI) pump. As a result, maintenance technicians inserted a plastic tube into the pump gear box introducing foreign material (FM) into the bearing oil system. This issue was entered into the licensee's CAP and corrective actions included labeling of the oil sampling tube and establishing a written pre-job briefing for taking oil samples.

The licensee's failure to provide adequate instructions to perform oil sampling on the 2B NI pump was a PD. The PD was more than minor because it affected the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that FM was introduced into the pump's bearing oil system that could have resulted in the 2B NI pump not performing its safety function. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its Technical Specifications (TS) allowed outage time. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect of human error prevention techniques in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because a detailed pre-job brief or an appropriate questioning attitude by the technicians would have prevented this condition. [H.4(a)] (Section 1R12)

Inspection Report# : [2011003](#) (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Significance:  Mar 31, 2011

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to update bases for EAL changes

An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 50.54(q) with two examples was identified for failing to maintain emergency plans that meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The licensee failed to revise the Emergency Action Level (EAL) basis which potentially impacted the licensee's ability to accurately and timely classify emergency conditions. The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as Problem Investigation Program report (PIP) C-11-2304.

The failure to revise the EAL basis document as required by the Catawba Emergency Plan was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the potential to incorrectly classify events

associated with the fission product barrier matrix or security-event classification scheme within the brief time available would lead to a more significant safety concern. This finding was associated with the risk significant planning standard (RSPS) 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss or degradation of a RSPS function. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of complete and accurate procedures in the Resources component of the Human Performance area because the procedure used to evaluate EAL changes, EPFAM Section 3.10, did not include a requirement to change the EAL basis document as appropriate. [H.2(c)] (Section 1EP4)
Inspection Report# : [2011002](#) (*pdf*)

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : March 02, 2012