

# Limerick 2

## 1Q/2010 Plant Inspection Findings

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### Initiating Events

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### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:**  Dec 31, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Failure to Ensure Adequate Cooling Water Flow to Residual Heat Removal Room Unit Cooler**

The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, "Test Control," for improperly positioning the Emergency Service Water (ESW) throttle valve to the Unit 1 'A' Residual Heat Removal (RHR) room unit cooler during an ESW flow balance surveillance test in April 2008. During the test, Exelon failed to adequately evaluate ESW flow data, and established ESW flow to the unit cooler at less than the minimum required. This rendered the 'A' RHR room unit cooler incapable of removing its design heat load for a period of approximately 13 months. Exelon entered this issue into their corrective action program for resolution.

This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and it impacted the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Exelon's failure to accurately evaluate test data resulted in an inadequate ESW flow rate through the 'A' RHR room unit cooler, rendering it incapable of removing its design heat load. The finding is of very low safety significance because it did not represent a loss of safety function of a TS train or risk-significant non-TS train. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance, Work Practices Component because Exelon personnel did not utilize adequate human error prevention techniques, such as self and peer checking, to ensure work activities were performed properly. [H.4(a)]

Inspection Report# : [2009005](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Dec 31, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Failure to Identify Degraded Instrument Line in Emergency Service Water System**

The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions," for Exelon's failure to identify a condition adverse to quality associated with the 'A' ESW pump discharge pressure instrument line. Specifically, Exelon had previous opportunity to identify and repair a degraded 'A' ESW instrument line following a leak on a similar instrument line in August 2008. However, the degraded condition of the 'A' instrument line was not detected until it resulted in a through-wall leak on November 7, 2009. In response to the leak, Exelon was required to isolate the 'A' ESW pump and enter the associated 45-day TS action statement. Exelon entered this issue into their corrective action program as Issue Report (IR) 990204 and IR 993012. Corrective actions included performing an investigation and scheduling extent of condition testing on the remaining 18 similar instrument lines.

The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and it impacted the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, upon discovery of the through wall leak, Exelon was required to isolate the 'A' ESW pump and enter the associated 45 day TS action statement. The finding is of very low safety significance because it did not represent the loss of a TS train for greater than its allowed outage time. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action Program, because Exelon did not take appropriate corrective actions to address a safety issue regarding corrosion in

**Significance:**  Oct 30, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Failure to Verify Battery Capacity to Recover from Station Blackout**

The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.63, “Loss of All Alternating Current (AC) Power,” because Exelon's coping analysis did not determine whether the battery capability and capacity was sufficient to recover AC power at the end of the required coping period. Specifically, Exelon's battery sizing and station blackout (SBO) load profile calculation did not include those loads necessary to recover AC power, such as starting an emergency diesel generator (EDG) or closing 4 kV switchgear breakers. As a result, the calculation did not verify there was adequate direct current (DC) voltage available to critical equipment during the SBO coping period. Exelon entered the issue into their corrective action program and performed an operability assessment which determined the battery was operable.

This issue was more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. The team determined the finding was of very low safety significance because it was a design deficiency subsequently confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality. The finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because it was determined to be a legacy issue not considered to be indicative of current licensee performance. (Section 1R21.2.1.1)

Inspection Report# : [2009006](#) (pdf)

**Significance:**  Sep 30, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Failure to Adequately Test 480 Volt Motor Control Unit Circuit Breakers**

The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, “Test Control,” for failure to establish a test program for all safety-related 480 volt motor control unit (MCU) circuit breakers to assure that necessary testing was performed to demonstrate that they would perform the safety-related function in service. Specifically, in 2004, Exelon inappropriately classified certain safety related 480 volt molded-case circuit breakers as run-to-failure in the Performance Centered Maintenance (PCM) process, which resulted in the breakers receiving no planned preventive maintenance or testing. Exelon entered this issue into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) for resolution as Issue Report (IR) 948232. Exelon's corrective actions included: reclassifying all safety-related 480 volt MCUs as either “critical” or “non-critical,” a formal review of the vendor's technical bulletin for applicability; and an extent of condition review of all direct current MCUs and 4 kilovolt circuit breakers. Also, preventive maintenance and testing was planned for all in-service 480 volt MCUs that had gone overdue because they were inappropriately classified as “run-to-failure.”

This finding is more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency would lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the installed molded case circuit breakers classified as run-to-failure had received no periodic planned maintenance or tests and were beyond the manufacturer's design life. Based on operating experience, this would result in a breaker being slow to trip or sticking in the “on” position after an over-current condition. The inspectors assessed the finding using Phase 1 of IMC 0609, Attachment 4, “Phase 1 – Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings” and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because the issue was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability per “Part 9900, Technical Guidance, Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessment.” Since the change to the PCM process was made in 2004, the inspectors determined that this finding was not reflective of current licensee performance and, therefore, did not have a cross cutting aspect.

Inspection Report# : [2009004](#) (pdf)

**Significance:** **G** Sep 30, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Failure to Correct 480V Breaker Thermography**

The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” for failing to correct a condition adverse to quality associated with the performance of thermography on safety-related breakers. Specifically, although Exelon identified that the failure to perform thermography on breakers in a loaded condition was a causal factor for an electrical fault that occurred in January 2009, Exelon did not implement proper corrective actions to ensure that applicable future thermography examinations would be conducted while the equipment was in a loaded condition. Exelon entered this issue into the CAP as IR 874599, Assignment 58. Corrective actions included adding 48 breakers to the list of breakers that will be loaded prior to thermography and creating an assignment to formally assess the remaining breakers that may not receive routine thermography due to not being in a loaded condition.

The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors assessed the finding using Phase 1 of IMC 0609, Attachment 4, “Phase 1 – Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings” and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action Program, because Exelon did not take appropriate corrective actions to address a safety issue [P.1(d)]. Specifically, although the failure to perform thermography on breakers in loaded conditions was identified as a causal factor for an electrical fault, actions were not taken in a timely manner to ensure loaded conditions for applicable future thermography examinations

Inspection Report# : [2009004](#) (pdf)

**Significance:** **G** Jun 17, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

**Failure to Adequately Assess Erratic Time Delay Relay Operation on Unit 2 HPCI Operability**

The inspectors identified a Green finding associated with the failure to adequately assess erratic time delay relay operation on Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system operability in a timely manner commensurate with the potential safety significance. Following a failed surveillance test, the Unit 2 HPCI system was considered operable despite having no “as-left” data for a system time delay relay, because of erratic operation, and failing to adequately address the relay’s design basis function. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors assessed the finding using Phase 1 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, “Significance Determination Process for Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations” and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent a loss of safety function of a single train. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in Human Performance, Decision-Making, because Exelon did not make a safety-significant decision using a systematic process, especially when faced with uncertain or unexpected plant conditions, to ensure safety is maintained [H.1(a)]. This included not obtaining timely interdisciplinary input and review on the safety significant decision (H.1(a)).

Inspection Report# : [2009003](#) (pdf)

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## Barrier Integrity

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# Emergency Preparedness

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## Occupational Radiation Safety

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## Public Radiation Safety

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## Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

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## Miscellaneous

Last modified : May 26, 2010