

Hatch 2

1Q/2010 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance:  Mar 31, 2010

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: FIN Finding

Failure to implement adequate configuration control on Unit 2 main generator stator water cooling temperature control instrument loop, 2N43-F100

A self-revealing finding was identified for the licensee's failure to create, implement, and make available to maintenance personnel, quality processes or documents for configuration control. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain the correct configuration of the stator water cooling (SWC) temperature control instrument loop air-operated valve, 2N43-F100, as required by licensee procedure NMP-ES-014, Air Operated Valve Program. The failure to implement adequate configuration control on the SWC temperature control instrument loop directly resulted in a Unit 2 reactor scram on June 20, 2009. The licensee has addressed this issue in their Corrective Action Program (CAP) and developed corrective actions in CR 2009106326. As part of the licensee's immediate corrective actions the Unit 2 SWC instrument loop was reconfigured to the correct alignment, and changes were made to procedure NMP-ES-014.

This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability. Specifically, inadequate configuration control resulted in a Unit 2 reactor scram on June 20, 2009. The significance of this finding was screened using the Phase 1 of the Significance Determination Process (SDP) in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Attachment 4. Because the finding contributed to a reactor scram, but did not affect mitigation equipment availability, the finding screened as Green. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Resources component of the Human Performance area, because the licensee did not provide complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation, procedures, and work packages, and correct labeling of components. Specifically, the licensee did not implement a means of configuration control of the SWC temperature control instrument loop. (H.2(c)). (Section 4OA3.1)

Inspection Report# : [2010002](#) (*pdf*)

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Jul 31, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Correctly Establish Acceptance Criteria for the Standby Diesel Service Water Pump Section

The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for failure to correctly establish acceptance criteria for the Standby Diesel Service Water (SDSW) System. The licensee performed a past operability determination and initiated Condition Report (CR) 2009105651 to revise the acceptance criteria.

The licensee's failure to correctly establish acceptance criterion for the SDSW pump under the most limiting conditions was a performance deficiency. The finding is greater than minor because it adversely affected the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding is of very low safety significance (Green) using the SDP because it did not represent a loss of system or safety function. A cross-cutting aspect was not identified because the finding does not represent current performance.

Inspection Report# : [2009006](#) (pdf)

Significance:  Jul 31, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Monitor the Main Steam and Feedwater Line Pipe Whip Restraints

The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) for the licensee's failure to monitor the main steam line and feedwater line pipe whip restraints for Units 1 and 2. The licensee initiated CRs 2009105147 and 200910622 and plans to complete inspections of the whip restraints during the upcoming Units 1 and 2 outages.

The licensee's failure to periodically inspect the condition of the safety-related pipe whip restraints was a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team determined that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) using the SDP because the finding did not represent an actual loss of safety function. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting aspect of implementing a corrective action program with a low threshold for identifying issues under the Corrective Action Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area [P.1(a)].
Inspection Report# : [2009006](#) (pdf)

Significance:  Jun 30, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Maintain Fire Brigade Minimum Staffing

Green. A Green NRC identified NCV of License Conditions 2.C.(3) for Unit-1 and 2.C.(3).(a) for Unit-2 was identified for failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain adequate fire brigade staffing by assigning the Unit-1 Operator at the Controls (OATC) the additional responsibility of Fire Brigade Leader. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution.

This finding is more than minor because it affected the protection from external factors (fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the shift staffing compliment was adequate to support the safe shutdown operating functions and independent fire brigade. In addition, the condition existed for only one 12-hour shift. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting element of Human Performance. (Section 40A2)
Inspection Report# : [2009003](#) (pdf)

Barrier Integrity

Significance:  Jul 31, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Perform Cause Determinations and Corrective Actions for Deficiencies in Containment Penetration Seals

The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensee's failure to promptly correct deficiencies in containment penetration seals. The licensee initiated CR 2009105747 to evaluate corrective actions for the seals.

The team determined that the failure to take corrective actions for deficiencies in containment penetration seals was a performance deficiency. The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Structures, Systems and

Components (SSC) and Barrier Performance attribute of maintaining functionality of containment and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that containment protects the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting aspect of thoroughness of evaluation within the Corrective Action Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area [P.1(c)].

Inspection Report# : [2009006](#) (*pdf*)

Significance: G Jul 31, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Correctly Establish Containment Isolation Valve Leakage Criteria for the Unit 2 Feedwater Check Valves

The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for failure to correctly establish containment isolation valve leakage criteria for Unit 2 feedwater check valves. The licensee initiated CR 2009104567 and revised the associated calculation during the inspection.

The team determined that the failure to correctly establish leakage acceptance criteria for the feedwater check valves was a performance deficiency. The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the SSC and Barrier performance attribute of maintaining functionality of containment and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that containment protects the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment. The finding directly involved the cross-cutting aspect of complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation within the Resources component of the Human Performance area[H.2(c)].

Inspection Report# : [2009006](#) (*pdf*)

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : May 26, 2010