

Palisades

2Q/2009 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance:  Jun 30, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Failure to conduct an adequate risk assessment for an orange risk condition

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) without an associated NCV for failure to conduct an adequate risk assessment and recognize a procedurally required orange risk condition for the vacuum fill of the primary coolant system (PCS) during outage activities. In response to this issue, the licensee changed their risk assessment before performing the vacuum fill evolution. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report (CR) PLP 2009 02079.

The finding is more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix E, Example 7.e, because the planned evolution would have put the plant into a higher risk category per procedure GOP- 14 Attachment 19. In addition, if left uncorrected, the issue had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The inspectors determined the finding impacted the Initiating Events cornerstone whose objective is to, in part, limit those events that upset plant stability. Using IMC 0609, Appendix M, this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the licensee performed the risk management actions for the orange risk condition prior to performing the orange risk evolution. The inspectors concluded that this finding has a cross cutting aspect in the area of human performance, Work Control (H.3 (a)), because the licensee did not appropriately plan the work activities by properly incorporating risk insights by following the requirements of procedure GOP-14.

Inspection Report# : [2009003](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Jun 30, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Manage Risk in Reduced Inventory

The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) for the licensee's failure to manage the increase in risk by minimizing the plant's exposure to elevated risk during the 1R20 refueling outage. Specifically, during the first period of reduced inventory after shutdown with a reduced time to boil, the licensee's failure to appropriately manage and execute maintenance activities led to extended time being spent in the reduced inventory condition. Later in the outage, two unplanned entries into reduced inventory were required to diagnose and correct issues stemming from the 'D' Primary coolant pump impeller replacement. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report (CR) PLP 2009 03392.

The inspectors determined that a significant portion of the additional time spent in reduced inventory was within licensee control. The issue is greater than minor in that the licensee failed to manage activities in such a way as to minimize the time spent in reduced inventory. The inspectors determined the finding impacted the Initiating Events cornerstone whose objective is to, in part, limit those events that upset plant stability. The finding is of very low safety significance (Green) using Appendix M because it did not involve a loss of control nor did it require a quantitative analysis per IMC 0609 Appendix G, Attachment 1. The inspectors concluded that this finding has a cross cutting aspect in the area of human performance because a primary cause of the finding is associated with the human performance cross cutting component of work practices, in that the licensee failed to provide appropriate oversight for work activities consistent with nuclear safety.

Inspection Report# : [2009003](#) (*pdf*)

G**Significance:** Mar 31, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Implement Technical Specification

On February 20, 2009 the inspectors identified a Green NCV of TS 5.4, "Procedures". Specifically, the licensee failed to revise procedures needed to implement Technical Specification (TS) amendment 236; although, the licensee notified the NRC via letter on February 11 that the amendment had been implemented.

In response to NRC concerns related to swelling of Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) storage racks, the licensee performed testing of the neutron absorption capability of the spent fuel pool storage racks. Based on this testing, the licensee determined that the neutron absorption capability no longer met assumptions in their criticality analysis. Therefore, the licensee determined that design features TS 4.3 no longer provided adequate assurance that the spent fuel pool would remain subcritical for all required conditions. On August 27, 2008, the licensee sent a letter to the NRC identifying interim actions to ensure the SFP remained critically safe. On September 20, the NRC approved a Confirmatory Action letter (CAL) in response to that letter to confirm licensee actions. As part of the actions to restore compliance, the licensee developed TS amendment 236 to codify necessary controls to ensure the safety of the SFP. By letter dated February 11, the licensee informed the NRC that Amendment 236 had been implemented. The NRC inspected the actions taken by the licensee to implement the amendment and concluded that the licensee had failed to take actions required by licensee procedures to implement the amendment.

Since the CAL prohibited addition of new fuel to the SFP, the licensee needed the NRC to lift that CAL to support outage activities. In addition, loading of new fuel into the SFP required extensive use of two procedures directly affected by the amendment. Procedure EM 04 29 provides instruction on development of fuel loading sheets used to establish a safe and compliant SFP load pattern. The amendment added a new TS surveillance requirement, SR 3.7.16.1, which required verifying, by administrative means, that each fuel assembly meets the requirements given in TS 3.7.16. The licensee failed to revise this procedure to include the requirements of the amendment. Procedure SOP 28 provides instructions on moving fuel in the SFP and procedure ADM 10.51, "Writer's Guideline for Site Procedures," governs the format and content of the procedure. Required content includes identification of affected TS precautions and limitations that could result in non compliance with TS. The licensee failed to revise procedure SOP 28 to reflect those requirements.

Inspection Report# : [2009002](#) (*pdf*)

Mitigating Systems

G**Significance:** Mar 31, 2009

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inoperability of HPSI Valve Due to Foreign Material

On February 7, 2009, while attempting to fill the T 82C safety injection tank during routine operations, control room operators attempted to throttle open MO 3064, one of two HPSI isolation valves to primary coolant loop 2A. The valve did not reposition. The licensee declared the right train of HPSI inoperable and began troubleshooting to determine the cause of the failure. The valve had successfully operated earlier in the evolution. Later in the day, during troubleshooting of the valve motor's circuit breaker, electricians discovered a small strand from a Scotch Brite cleaning pad in one of the auxiliary contacts. The contacts are normally closed and act as a permissive for the valve motor to open the valve if the valve has a demand to open. The licensee determined that the foreign material became stuck between two contacts, thus preventing the contact from closing and the valve from operating. This condition also would have prevented the valve from opening as designed during a safety injection actuation signal. The licensee last performed maintenance in December 2008. During the maintenance, electricians cleaned and lightly buffed the contacts using a Scotch-Brite pad. The breaker passed post-maintenance testing. After evaluating the failure, the licensee concluded that the Scotch-Brite strand was introduced to the circuit breaker through the cleaning process. The licensee subsequently removed the strand and retested the valve satisfactorily.

A review of the work instruction and maintenance procedure for FME controls revealed only a general reference to take precautions when moving or storing breakers and parts. The fleet FME procedure, EN MA 118, did have several applicable examples of when certain FME controls should be employed and examples of how to incorporate them into maintenance procedures and work instructions. A licensee search for relevant operating experience yielded some examples applicable to this issue as well.

Inspection Report# : [2009002](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Mar 31, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Degradation of Fire Doors

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated NCV of License Condition 2.C.(3), "Fire Protection," during performance of a surveillance procedure inspection in accordance with IP 71111.22. Specifically, the inspectors noted numerous fire doors that did not conform to the requirements of NFPA 80.

As part of the licensee's fire protection strategy, the licensee credits numerous fire doors to limit the spread of fire between adjacent fire zones. NFPA 80, which the licensee's fire hazards analysis invokes for acceptability of fire doors, provides criteria for the acceptability of fire doors. Generic Letter 86 10 permits evaluation of deviations from NFPA requirements by a fire protection engineer to determine if the condition provides adequate protection based on the hazards present. The licensee's analysis failed to demonstrate the barriers would be effective based on the hazards present and, in some cases, provided generic deviations from NFPA 80 requirements. After discussions with the inspectors, the licensee impaired numerous fire doors and re-evaluated the condition of the discrepant doors. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation and concluded that none of the degradation was of more than very low safety significance.

Inspection Report# : [2009002](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Dec 31, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Testing of Control Room Chillers

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, "Test Control", for the inadequate testing of the heat removal capacity of the CR HVAC system. Specifically, the licensee isolated refrigerant hot gas bypass flow during the test which increases the heat removal capability of the Chiller. The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program as CR-PLP-2008-3993 and re-performed portions of the engineering basis calculation to demonstrate margin to account for the hot gas bypass flow.

The finding is more than minor because in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues," the inspectors determined that the finding was similar to Example j and resulted in a reasonable doubt as to the operability of the chiller. Based upon a review of the licensee's revised calculation for the CR HVAC system acceptance criteria and the technical specification requirements, the finding screens as very low safety significance (green) using the Phase 1 significance determination process worksheets. The inspectors determined that the finding included a cross cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources, complete and accurate procedures (H2c) because the surveillance procedure unacceptably preconditioned the chiller.

Inspection Report# : [2008005](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Dec 31, 2008

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperable in Excess of Technical Specification Requirements

A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated NCV of technical specification requirement 3.8.1.b was discovered when metal fragments were found in the valve assembly area of the 1-2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) cylinder 2L. The source of the fragments was a failed spring lock for one of the exhaust valves. Subsequently, the licensee inspected the remaining spring locks on the 1-2 EDG and did an extent of condition analysis for the 1-1 EDG. Inspections of the 1-1 EDG spring locks are planned.

The finding is more than minor because it affected the mitigating system cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. A failure analysis performed by the vendor in conjunction with an apparent cause analysis by the licensee led to an evaluation that the diesel could perform its safety function for at least the 24 hour Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) mission time. Therefore, the finding screens as Green using the significance determination process phase 1 worksheets.

Inspection Report# : [2008005](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Dec 04, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Analysis of Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2 Loading During Design Basis Events.

A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," was identified by the inspectors for the failure to assure the loading on emergency diesel generator 1 2 was maintained within the 2-hour rating. Specifically, the licensee failed to evaluate the worst case design loading and procedurally allowed manual loading conditions when determining the emergency diesel generator load required for design basis loss-of-coolant-accident and loss-of-offsite-power conditions. The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program and performed an operability review to verify that the diesel generator would be capable of supplying the calculated load.

The finding was more than minor because it was similar to IMC 0612, Appendix E, Example 3.j, in that there was a reasonable doubt on the operability of emergency diesel generator 1–2, since emergency diesel generator loading conditions above the 2-hour rating were neither adequately calculated nor periodically tested. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance because it was a design deficiency that did not result in actual loss of safety function. The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because the performance deficiency was related to a historical design issue and not indicative of current licensee performance.

Inspection Report# : [2008009](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Dec 04, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Establish Correct Technical Specification Limits.

A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," was identified by the inspectors for the failure to correctly translate the applicable design basis into the Technical Specifications limit for the emergency diesel generator, day tank fuel oil volume. Specifically, the licensee failed to incorporate the appropriate emergency diesel generator load profile when calculating the emergency diesel generator fuel oil consumption. The Technical Specifications requirement for the day tank fuel oil volume assured an allowed outage time for the limiting fuel oil transfer pump. This finding resulted in a non-conservative Technical Specifications value. As a result, the licensee implemented compensatory actions to administratively limit the allowed outage time for the limiting fuel oil transfer pump that corresponded to the available day tank fuel.

The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because the finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring availability of the emergency diesel generator to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding screened as of very low safety significance because the finding was a design or qualification deficiency

confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because the performance deficiency was related to a historical design issue and not indicative of current licensee performance.

Inspection Report# : [2008009](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Sep 30, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Degradation of the 3-hour Fire Barrier

The inspectors identified a Green NCV of License condition 2.C.(3), Fire Protection, for failure to maintain a three hour barrier between two safety related rooms. Specifically, the inspectors noted a through-wall crack in the three hour fire wall between the 1-1 and 1-2 diesel rooms. The licensee entered the issue in the corrective action program as CR-PLP-2008-02696 and repaired the crack.

Inspection Report# : [2008004](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Sep 30, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Auxilliary Feed Water Low Suction Pressure Trip Setpoints

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control, " for the tank damage from tornado born missiles. Specifically, the licensee used low CST level trips to protect the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps but the trips did not protect the pump during certain severe weather conditions (tornado). This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR-PLP-2006-00659 and CR-PLP-2006-00961; and the licensee has implemented compensatory actions to ensure the AFW function is available during severe weather.

Inspection Report# : [2008004](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Sep 25, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Establish and Implement Procedures Controlling Access to Containment

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1 for failure to implement procedures required to control access into containment. The corrective actions planned by the licensee include developing and implementing a comprehensive containment access control procedure. The issue was entered in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report (CR) CR-PLP-2008 3334.

The finding was considered more than minor, because given the need to access containment for licensing basis events, if left uncorrected, the finding could become a more significant safety concern. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance, (Green), because no event occurred where access to the containment affected the response to any initiating events. This finding involved many recent opportunities to identify that a containment access procedure was not established, implemented, or maintained. Consequently, this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution (P.1(a)) because the licensee failed to identify issues completely, accurately, and in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance.

Inspection Report# : [2008010](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Sep 25, 2008

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: FIN Finding

Failure to Properly Maintain the Emergency Escape Hatch as an Escape Hatch

A self-revealed finding of very low significance was identified for the failure to ensure the emergency escape hatch would operate as designed when needed. The licensee failed to maintain the hatch in a condition that it could be

operated as an emergency escape hatch. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program. Immediate corrective actions included a pre-entry brief on door operations, printed operating instructions, and a requirement to have a hammer for hatch operation. This is not a violation of NRC requirements.

The finding was considered more than minor, because the failure to maintain configuration control for the emergency escape hatch could have a credible impact on the licensee's ability to promptly ingress and egress the containment during emergency operations such as fire inside the containment. If left uncorrected, the finding could become a more significant safety concern. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance, (Green), because no event occurred where access to the containment affected the response to any initiating event.

Inspection Report# : [2008010](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Sep 25, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Organizational Evaluation of Shutdown Risk for the Forced Outage.

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for failure to implement procedure EN-OU-101, "Forced Outage Planning and Preparation." This procedure stated, in part, that forced outages should undergo a risk assessment in accordance with station risk assessment guidance. Upon questioning by the inspectors, it was identified that the station risk assessment group did not review the outage template for risk for the forced outage started on August 5, 2008. The licensee wrote CR-PLP-2008-03485 to address the issue. This is not a violation of NRC requirements, because the licensee's formal method for risk assessment is contained in another procedure. EN-OU-101 provides defense in depth. See section 40A7 for details on the formal risk assessment.

The inspectors determined that this issue was more than minor, because if left uncorrected the item could become a more significant safety concern. In this case, the licensee failed to realize during their review required by other procedures that partial draining of the pressurizer with a primary vent path open and a short time to core boiling resulted in an Orange risk path. It is reasonable to conclude the review in EN-OU-101 would have detected the Orange path. This finding was screened as very low safety significance (Green) since the plant was not in reduced inventory and all containment penetrations were capable of prompt closure. The inspectors determined the finding was associated with a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Control (H.3(a)), since the licensee did not appropriately plan work activities by incorporating risk insights as recommended by a station procedure.

Inspection Report# : [2008010](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Aug 01, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

This is a security related item - see inspection report for details.

This finding, affecting the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, is related to mitigative measures developed to cope with losses of large areas of the plant; in response to Section B.5.b of the February 25, 2002, Interim Compensatory Measures (ICM) Order (EA-02-026) and related NRC guidance. This finding has been designated as "Official Use Only - Security-Related Information": therefore, the details of this finding are being withheld from public disclosure. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance - Facilities & Equipment. See inspection report for more details.

Inspection Report# : [2008007](#) (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Significance:  Sep 25, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Develop and Maintain Containment Personnel and Emergency Escape Hatch Procedures

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of TS 5.4.1.a, for the failure to ensure the personnel and emergency escape hatch instructions were adequately maintained and properly implemented for use during a time when the containment was occupied. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program. Immediate corrective actions included a pre-entry brief on the hatch operations; printed operating instructions for the personnel and emergency escape hatches including proper closing techniques, a picture of where to hit the lever on the emergency escape hatch; and a hammer to take into containment.

The finding was determined to be more than minor, because the issue contributed to the failure of personnel to properly close the outer personnel hatch as well as the inability to close the outer escape hatch while it was required to be closed for containment integrity. This finding was similar to IMC 0612, Appendix E, Section 4, example d, in that the performance deficiency was shown to significantly impact the operator's ability to do the task. The finding affects the Reactor Safety Cornerstone objective of containment integrity, and the Barrier Integrity attribute of Procedure Quality. This finding was of very low safety significance because the inner personnel hatch and the inner emergency escape hatch were closed and maintained the containment boundary. The inspectors determined the finding was associated with a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources (H.2(c)), because the licensee failed to update written instructions for manipulating plant equipment.

Inspection Report# : [2008010](#) (*pdf*)

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Significance: **W** Nov 19, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: VIO Violation

Failure To Assess Dose To Three Workers After A Known Change In Radiological Conditions Near The Spent Fuel Pool

The inspector identified a finding and associated Apparent Violation of 10 CFR 20.1501 for the failure to perform adequate radiological evaluations necessary to properly quantify the radiological hazards to assess the dose from the conditions that were identified through electronic dosimeter alarms (dose rate). On October 4, 2007, after the licensee was notified of unexpected radiological conditions through electronic dosimeter alarms (dose rate), the licensee failed to recognize radiological hazards in the work place associated with the handling and disassembly of fuel reconstitution equipment. Specifically, the licensee failed to recognize the presence of high beta dose rate discrete radioactive particles (DRPs), and alpha contamination and, therefore, failed to assess the radiological hazard associated with the work activity and the dose to the three workers involved. The licensee failed to account for the workers' extremity doses associated with handling the temporary storage baskets (TSBs) and the exposure to the particles. Additionally, the licensee failed to assess the total organ doses to the bone surface from potential intakes of alpha contamination. As corrective actions, the licensee revised monitoring practices for spent fuel pool work.

The finding is more than minor because it impacted the program and process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation, in that the failure to perform evaluations for discrete radioactive particles and alpha contamination impacted the licensee's ability to assess dose to the workers. The inspector determined that this finding was not related to as-low-as-is-reasonably-achievable (ALARA) Planning or Work Controls. The NRC could not determine that there was an overexposure. Additionally, the NRC could not determine that there was a substantial potential for overexposure. The inspector determined that the ability to assess dose was compromised. Specifically, DRPs and alpha contamination were identified following the incident; however, the licensee failed to account for the workers' extremity dose associated with handling temporary storage baskets (TSBs) and to assess the total organ dose

to the bone surface from potential intakes of alpha contamination. Based on the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process (SDP), the inspector preliminarily determined that the finding is White. The cause of this deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance. Specifically, the licensee failed to utilize conservative assumptions in decision making and did not adopt a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action is safe in order to proceed (H.1(b)).

Final Significance Determination letter issued 1/30/2009 as a White.
Inspection Report# : [2008011](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Nov 19, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure To Implement Effective Radiological Controls For Working With Equipment In Contact With Failed Fuel

An NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR 20.1501 was identified for failure to perform adequate radiological evaluations necessary to properly assess the radiological hazards and prescribe appropriate radiological controls necessary to minimize dose to workers associated with failed fuel. Fuel reconstitution, a planned activity for the refueling outage, had a high potential to result in discrete radioactive particles and alpha contamination from the degraded fuel pins. The licensee failed to anticipate these radiological hazards and to implement appropriate controls to minimize exposure to radiation. As corrective actions, the license revised all radiation work permits (RWPs) associated with work in the spent fuel pool.

The finding is more than minor because it impacted the program and process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation, in that, the licensee did not implement radiological controls necessary to minimize dose to workers. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was not an ALARA planning issue, the NRC could not identify an overexposure nor potential for overexposure, and the licensee's ability to assess dose was not compromised. The cause of this deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance. Specifically, the licensee failed to appropriately plan the work activity by incorporating risk insights and job site conditions, including environmental conditions, which may impact radiological safety (H.3(a)).

Inspection Report# : [2008011](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Nov 19, 2008

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Post and Control Access to High Radiation Area

A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of Technical Specification 5.7.1 was identified for the failure to post and control an area with dose rates greater than 100 millirem/hour as a high radiation area. Specifically, the area of the refuel floor that contained the fuel reconstitution equipment was not posted as a high radiation area. Dose rates of approximately 450 millirem/hour were measured 30 centimeters (cm) from the equipment after three workers received electronic dosimeter alarms (dose rate). As corrective actions, the licensee corrected the radiological posting and controls for the area.

The finding is more than minor because it impacted the program and process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation, in that, job specific radiological surveys failed to identify elevated dose rates around the spent fuel pool during fuel reconstitution demobilization. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was not an ALARA planning issue, there was no overexposure nor potential for overexposure, and the licensee's ability to assess dose was not compromised. This finding appeared to be caused by inadequate coordination of work activities between the radiation protection staff and the contractors. Consequently, the cause of this deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance. Specifically, the licensee failed to appropriately coordinate work activities by incorporating actions to communicate, coordinate, and cooperate with each other during activities in which inter-departmental coordination is necessary to assure plant and human performance (H.3(b)).

Public Radiation Safety

Significance:  Sep 30, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to incorporate results from the annual land use census

The inspector identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an NCV of Technical Specification 5.5.1 and ODCM Appendix A, Section J.3.c associated with the failure to incorporate the annual land use census in the Radioactive Environmental Monitoring Program.

Inspection Report# : [2008004](#) (*pdf*)

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : August 31, 2009