

# Sequoyah 1

## 1Q/2007 Plant Inspection Findings

---

### Initiating Events

---

### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:**  Dec 31, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Failure to Certify Qualifications and Status of Licensed Operators Were Current and Valid**

The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 55.53, "Conditions of Licenses" for failure to certify the qualifications and status of licensed operators were current and valid prior to their resumption of license duties. Specific aspects of the requalification program that were not valid included plant tours that were not completed with another licensed operator and not completing all shift functions in positions to which the individuals will be assigned. The licensee entered the finding into the corrective action program as PER No.112004.

The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone that affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of operators to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences that could pose a potential risk to operations. The finding was evaluated using the Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process. Under this SDP, record deficiencies can be either minor or of very low safety significance (Green). This finding was determined to be Green because it was related to the program for maintaining active licenses and more than 20% of the records reviewed had deficiencies.

Inspection Report# : [2006005 \(pdf\)](#)

**Significance:**  Dec 31, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Inadequate 20-foot Separation Zones for Fire Protection in Unit 1 480V Board Room 1B**

The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Unit 1 License Condition 16, Fire Protection, and Unit 2 License Condition 13, Fire Protection, for failure to protect certain equipment that was required for safe shutdown from fire damage. The licensee's Safe Shutdown Analysis for a fire in the Unit 1 480V Board Room 1B (Fire Area FAA-095) relied on the fire not damaging at least two of the three Unit 1 battery chargers located in the room plus one of the two Unit 1 inverters and one of the two Unit 2 inverters located in the room. However, the battery chargers and inverters were not separated or protected from fire damage as required by the License Conditions and Fire Protection Program. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program.

This finding is of greater than minor safety significance because it affected the objectives of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone of Reactor Safety. It affected the availability and reliability of systems that mitigate initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences and also involved a lack of required fire barriers or separation for equipment relied upon for safe shutdown following a fire. The finding is of very low safety significance because of the low frequency of fires that could damage two of the three Unit 1 battery chargers, both Unit 1 inverters, or both Unit 2 inverters that were located in the Unit 1 480V Board Room 1B concurrent with a failure of the sprinkler system.

Inspection Report# : [2006005 \(pdf\)](#)

**Significance:**  Dec 31, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

## **Unprotected Power Cables to Vital Inverters in the Unit 1 480V Board Room 1B**

The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Unit 1 License Condition 16, Fire Protection, and Unit 2 License Condition 13, Fire Protection, for failure to protect certain electrical cables for safe shutdown equipment from fire damage. The power cables to Unit 1 vital inverter 1-II and Unit 2 vital inverter 2-II were routed through the north end of the Unit 1 480V Board Room 1B (Fire Area FAA-095) without protection or separation from fire damage as required by the License Conditions and Fire Protection Program. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program and revised the fire procedure to add local manual operator actions to mitigate the effects of fire damage to the cables of concern.

This finding is of greater than minor safety significance because it affected the objectives of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone of Reactor Safety. It affected the availability and reliability of systems that mitigate initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences and also involved a lack of required fire barriers or separation for equipment relied upon for safe shutdown following a fire. The finding is of very low safety significance because of the low frequency of fires that could damage the cables of concern and also damage the redundant safe shutdown equipment.

Inspection Report# : [2006005](#) (*pdf*)

---

## **Barrier Integrity**

---

## **Emergency Preparedness**

---

## **Occupational Radiation Safety**

---

## **Public Radiation Safety**

---

## **Physical Protection**

[Physical Protection](#) information not publicly available.

---

## **Miscellaneous**

Last modified : June 01, 2007