

Robinson 2

1Q/2006 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Mar 31, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Demonstrate Performance of Safety-Related Breaker Effectively Controlled

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) for failure to demonstrate that the performance of a safety-related breaker was being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance, in that repetitive failures that caused a performance criteria to be exceeded were not identified and, as a result goal setting and monitoring was not conducted as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1).

The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The failure to identify and properly account for repetitive failures of a safety-related valve breaker resulted in goal setting and monitoring not being performed between the period of October 2005 and March 2006. This finding was of very low safety significance because it is not a design or qualification deficiency, does not represent an actual loss of safety function for a system or train, and is not risk significant due to a seismic, fire, flooding, or severe weather initiating event.. The cause of this finding is inattention to detail during validation and verification of assumptions made during the MR evaluations, and is therefore, identified as a performance aspect of the Human Performance cross-cutting area. (Section 1R12)

Inspection Report# : [2006002\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Jun 30, 2005

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

FAILURE TO IDENTIFY AND CORRECT A SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE THAT UNACCEPTABLY PRECONDITIONS THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMPS

Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, for failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality, in that a surveillance procedure that directed unacceptable preconditioning of the residual heat removal (RHR) pumps was not identified and corrected from 1997 to 2005.

The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability and reliability of systems that respond to events to prevent undesirable consequences. Unacceptable preconditioning of the RHR pump could mask a condition that renders the pump inoperable. The finding is of very low safety significance because it is not a design or qualification deficiency, does not represent an actual loss of safety function for a system or train, and is not risk significant due to a seismic, fire, flooding, or severe weather initiating event.

Inspection Report# : [2005003\(pdf\)](#)

Barrier Integrity

Significance:  Sep 30, 2005

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure of Two Procedures to Have Appropriate Acceptance Criteria for Restoration of Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Seal Cooling

The inspectors identified a green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V for two procedures which included instructions for restoring reactor coolant pump seal cooling but did not include any requirement or precaution regarding the time at which seal cooling is

restored, even though information provided by the Westinghouse Owners' Group indicated that restoration of RCP seal cooling was time-critical.

This finding was more than minor because it affected the procedure quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that the reactor coolant system protects the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The finding was evaluated using Appendix A to Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process. Because the finding affects a Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective, the Phase 1 worksheet requires a Phase 3 risk evaluation be completed. A Phase 3 screening analysis was conducted and determined that because of the low likelihood of a station blackout, and the probable recovery of an offsite or onsite alternating-current power source prior to core damage, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance.

Inspection Report# : [2005004\(pdf\)](#)

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

[Physical Protection](#) information not publicly available.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : May 25, 2006