

Robinson 2

3Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Sep 03, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

UNAPPROVED LOCAL MANUAL OPERATOR ACTIONS INSTEAD OF REQUIRED PHYSICAL PROTECTION OR SEPARATION OF CABLES TO PRECLUDE FIRE DAMAGE

A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, was identified for relying on unapproved local manual operator actions instead of the required physical protection or separation of cables from fire damage. The operator actions were to be accomplished outside the main control room (MCR) and were relied on for hot safe shutdown from the MCR for a severe fire in the south cable vault or the B emergency diesel generator room. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program. The operator actions could reasonably be accomplished and are acceptable as compensatory actions until full compliance with the regulation is restored. The finding adversely affected the reliability and capability of equipment required to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition following a severe fire. The finding degraded the defense-in-depth for fire protection. The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors attribute and degraded the reactor safety mitigating systems cornerstone objective. Because the manual actions could reasonably be accomplished, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance.

Inspection Report# : [2004006\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Sep 03, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

INOPERABLE FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION SEAL

A non-cited violation of Operating License Condition E, Fire Protection Program, was identified for failure to identify and correct a through-wall hole in a penetration seal fire barrier. The penetration seal was in a three-hour fire rated wall separating the Unit 2 cable spreading room from the turbine building. Upon discovery, the licensee declared the penetration seal inoperable, entered the issue into the corrective action program, and installed a temporary repair. The finding adversely affected the reliability and capability of equipment required to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition following a severe fire. The finding adversely affected the fire confinement defense-in-depth element of fire protection. The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors attribute and degraded the reactor safety mitigating systems cornerstone. Because the hole through the seal was small (less than about 1/8 inch in diameter), the finding was determined to have very low safety significance.

Inspection Report# : [2004006\(pdf\)](#)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Significance:  Dec 13, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

FAILURE TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE ON-SITE STAFF FOR EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTATION

Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), "Emergency Plans", for failure to maintain, at all times, adequate on-site staffing to provide initial facility accident response in the Emergency Action Levels following a seismic event. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone attribute of Emergency Response Organization Readiness to ensure that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a

radiological emergency. The finding was evaluated using the Emergency Preparedness SDP and was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not result in a complete loss of any planning standard function required by 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(2).

Inspection Report# : [2003006\(pdf\)](#)

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

[Physical Protection](#) information not publicly available.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : December 29, 2004