

Oconee 1

1Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Dec 31, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Take Timely/Effective Corrective Actions When Dispositioning a Component with Identified ASME Code Deficiencies and Non-Compliances

The inspectors identified a finding for the licensee's failure to perform timely/effective corrective actions when dispositioning a component with identified ASME Code deficiencies and non-compliances. A non-cited violation of 10 CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, was identified with respect to the failure to perform timely/effective corrective actions. The violation is greater than minor because it is associated with the mitigating system cornerstone attributes and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of the pressure boundary portion of a component used during Unit 1 design basis events. This finding was considered to be of very low safety significance because it was concluded that the component (1B condenser circulating water pump) could perform its intended pressure boundary safety function and that the issue could be resolved with NRC approval of relief requests. (Section 1R08.2)

Inspection Report# : [2002005\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Dec 31, 2002

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Improper Mode Change with Inoperable Atmospheric Dump Valve

An inadequately installed chain operator on atmospheric dump valve (ADV) block bypass valve 1MS-163 resulted in not having the ADVs available for both steam generators on Unit 1 operable during a mode change. A non-cited violation was identified for conducting a mode change without having the ADVs operable, as prescribed in Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.4 and TS 3.7.4. The violation affected the objective of the mitigating system cornerstone to protect against external factors (i.e., tornado) and was therefore, more than minor. This self-revealing finding was determined to be of very low significance due to the short exposure time and the limited initiating events affected by the loss of the ADV. (Section 1R12.1)

Inspection Report# : [2002005\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Dec 31, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Identify and Correct the Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Lube Oil Sump Water Intrusion

adverse Condition

The licensee failed to correct a water intrusion problem following identification in 1998, 1999, and 2000 that water was entering the Units 1 and 2 turbine driven emergency feedwater (EFW) pump lube oil sumps. A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, requirements was identified for failure to identify the source of the water intrusion, failure to identify the rate of water intrusion, and failure to correct the condition adverse to quality. Water in the turbine driven EFW pump lube oil sumps had a credible affect on the operability, availability, reliability and function of the TDEFW mitigation system and was therefore, more than minor. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance due to the multiple trains of equipment capable of performing secondary side heat removal not affected by the performance deficiency. This included two trains of motor driven EFW pumps per unit, potential cross connect of EFW between units, and the standby shutdown facility. (Section 1R12.2)

Inspection Report# : [2002005\(pdf\)](#)

G

Significance: Dec 31, 2002

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Perform Surveillance within the Required Periodicity

An inadequacy in the licensee's work planning program resulted in a missed Technical Specification (TS) required surveillance test involving the Keowee Hydro Station overhead power path. A non-cited violation of TS surveillance requirements (SR) 3.3.19.1, Channel Functional Test for Degraded Grid Voltage Protection Actuation Logic Channels, SR 3.8.1.15, 230kV Circuit Breaker Actuation on Switchyard Isolation, and TS 5.5.18, Keowee Hydro Unit Commercial Power Generation Testing Program, was identified when it was discovered that PT/0/A/610/022, Keowee Over Frequency Protection Functional Test, was not performed within the required TS SR frequency. This violation is more than minor because it affected the mitigating system cornerstone objective of equipment reliability, in that, a complex series of tests for the emergency power supply were not performed within the specified frequency. This self-revealing finding was determined to be of very low safety significance based on the fact that there was no unavailability of the Keowee units resulting from the missed surveillances. (Section 1R22.2)

Inspection Report# : [2002005\(pdf\)](#)

G

Significance: Sep 28, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Unauthorized Design Changes to the East Penetration Room Blowout Panels

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for the unauthorized design changes to the east penetration room blowout panels which changed the blowout panel design capability to remove water from the auxiliary building following a postulated main feedwater line rupture. This issue was considered to be of very low safety significance because at least one train of emergency feedwater would have been available during all of the accident sequences of concern. (Section 4OA5)

Inspection Report# : [2002004\(pdf\)](#)

G

Significance: Jun 29, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Complete a Timely Operability Evaluation for Failure of Non-Seismic Piping in the Control Rooms

A non-cited violation was identified for a failure to promptly identify conditions adverse to quality by completing the operability evaluation following identification that non-seismic piping was located in the ceiling of the shared control room for Units 1 and 2. The licensee was developing a modification package to remove the non-seismic piping from the control room. This issue was considered to be of very low safety significance because of the low probability of

piping failure and the ability of the operators to evacuate the control room and successfully shutdown Units 1 and 2 from the remote shutdown stations (Section 4OA5.1).

Inspection Report# : [2002002\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  May 03, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Testing of Pressurizer Code Safety Valves

Inadequate Testing of Pressurizer Code Safety Valves (Section 02.03B.(8))

Inspection Report# : [2002007\(pdf\)](#)

Barrier Integrity

Significance:  Jun 29, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Follow Procedures Resulting in Conducting Penetrant Examination on the Wrong Weld

A non-cited violation was identified for a failure to assure that a Penetrant Examination (PT) was performed on the correct weld or component in accordance with requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, which requires the use of written procedures; specifically in this case, Procedure NDE-35 and Drawing No. ISI OCN 1-009, Reactor Coolant Pump 1B1 Suction Piping. This finding was of very low safety significance because, although the inspectors identified that the licensee examiners performed the PT on the wrong weld, the PT was subsequently performed on the correct weld and found to be acceptable (Section 1R08).

Inspection Report# : [2002002\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Apr 08, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: VIO Violation

Inadequate Procedure Involving Containment Closure

Contrary to TS 5.4.1, AP/1,2,3/A/1700/26, Revision 10, was not adequately established to assure that containment closure would be achieved prior to the time at which a core uncover and fission product release could result from a loss of shutdown cooling. Specifically, the immediate manual actions of AP/1,2,3/A/1700/26 to establish containment closure lacked sufficient instructions to ensure that operators would not rely on a non-qualified temporary emergency hatch cover for containment closure; but instead, disconnect temporary services running through the temporary cover and shut the outer emergency hatch door.

Inspection Report# : [2002012\(pdf\)](#)

Inspection Report# : [2002014\(pdf\)](#)

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Miscellaneous

Significance: SL-IV Jul 26, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Update the FSAR Regarding Portions of the HPSW Piping in the Auxiliary Building

Contrary to 10 CFR 50.71(e), the licensee failed to update the FSAR regarding portions of the HPSW piping in the Auxiliary Building. [NOTE: Per the ROP, this type of issue is not evaluated through the SDP; but rather, it is to be evaluated in accordance with the guidance in Section IV.A.3 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Accordingly, the NRC determined that this violation should be characterized at Severity Level IV due to its low safety significance and because the particular regulatory process was not significantly impeded. Additionally, it was also determined that this violation should be non-cited in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy.]

Inspection Report# : [2002011\(pdf\)](#)

Last modified : May 30, 2003